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The Combat Stores Ship (AFS) Phased Maintenance
Program was authorized in 1979 as a -five year test e-f-fort
to stabilize deployment patterns for Atlantic Fleet AFSs
and to test a progressive maintenance policy similar to the
one used by the Military Seal i -ft Command.
This study analyzes the costs and benefits of the AFS
Phased Maintenance Program (AFSPMP) relative to the con-
ventional maintenance policy that was in use prior to the
AFSPMP. The depot and intermediate level maintenance manday
and dollar costs are estimated for four alternative main-
tenance policies to aid in determining how well the AFSPMP
is performing with regard to costs. The benefit analysis
presents several quantitative and qualitative aspects of
the AFSPMP and conclusions ^re drawn concerning the cost-
effectiveness of the AFSPMP as compared to the conventional
policy. Conclusions concerning the expansion of this
program to other classes of ships are also presented, along
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The Navy spends billions of dollars each year main-
taining its fleet of surface ships. More than fifty percent
of these funds is spent in overhauling them. During recent
years ship overhaul costs have risen dramatically making it
difficult for budgeteers to fund them adequately. The high
cost of maintenance has become a major concern to the Navy,
resulting in attempts to find maintenance strategies that
are more cost—effective.
The Navy ship overhaul problem is an extremely compli-
cated optimization problem that has not yet been solved.
The nature of the problem is to find the most cost-
effective method for scheduling and executing the depot
level maintenance of Navy ships. The problem is necessarily
very complex and presently the Navy is severely limited in
its ability to reliably predict the consequences of
alternative maintenance policies in terms of costs, ship
availability, and material condition. Computer and ana-
lytical models have been generated, but most of them focus
on subsets of the general problem in that they do not
consider all of the variables.
There are three basic levels of Navy ship maintenance.
At the lowest level, the ship's crew performs

organizational maintenance; intermediate maintenance is
accomplished primarily by Navy personnel in tenders, repair
ships, or an equivalent shore Intermediate Maintenance
Activity (IMA); and depot maintenance is accomplished by
public and private facilities, primarily shipyards. Depot
maintenance can be subdivided into scheduled Regular
Overhauls (ROHs) or Selected Restricted Availabilities
(SRAs) and unscheduled interoverhaul Restricted
Availabilities (RAVs) or Technical Availabilities (TAVs)
.
An RAV requires the presence o-f the ship at the repair
-facility and renders a ship incapable o-f performing its
mission. A TAV does not require the ship to be present and
does not affect the ship's ability to perform its mission
CRef. 1: pp. A-62, A-73!l. Better management of these three
levels of maintenance activity could potentially result in
enormous savings to the Department of Defense and alloM
these funds to be used elsewhere. The Navy's basic
maintenance strategy for support ships in the past has been
a policy of periodic lengthy regular overhauls with a
considerable amount of interoverhaul maintenance being
performed by ship's crew and intermediate maintenance
facilities. This will be referred to as the conventional
maintenance policy.
For several years the Navy's maintenance policies have
been criticized by the Congress, General Accounting Office,
and other government activities. Some of this criticism
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started as a result o-f work done in the early 1970's by
Cooper and Company. In 1974, comparisons of different
maintenance policies and approaches revealed that the costs
of maintaining a fleet oiler (AO) were far greater than the
corresponding costs for the Military Seal if t Command (MSC)
tankers/fleet oilers and enormously greater than the costs
incurred by companies maintaining commercial tankers CRef.
2: p. 10 3. This indicates that the Navy might be able to
reduce some of its maintenance costs through utilization of
a maintenance policy similar to that used by MSC or
commercial organizations.
The Navy has taken many steps to increase ship overhaul
effectiveness. Most of these have been relatively minor
changes in various aspects of overhaul policies
—
contracting, management practices, etcetera. In response to
outside pressure and the specific problems encountered by
the three combat stores ships (AFS-1 MARS class) assigned
to the Atlantic Fleet, a major change in maintenance policy
was devised with the hope that, if successful, it could be
applied to other classes of ships. In 1979 the Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) authorized the AFS Phased
Maintenance Program (AFSPMP) as a pilot effort with the
Atlantic Fleet AFSs in an attempt to stabilize ship
The Military Seal if t Command is a Navy command with
fleet status and is one of three Transportation Operating
Agencies established by direction of the Department of
Defense CRef. 3: p. 11-6 3.
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schedules and test a maintenance plan similar to that
employed by liSC. A direct comparison of the two maintenance
philosophies will be presented in Chapter V.
B. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
The CNO authorized the AFS Phased Maintenance Program
in 1979 as a five year test effort to: (1) modify the AFS
overhaul cycle to minimize the duration of depot level
maintenance periods to facilitate keeping one of three
ships forward deployed at all times and (2) test a
maintenance plan similar to that employed by the Military
Seal if t Command and commercial shipowners to determine
possible benefits to the Navy CRef- 4: p. 11. The actual
five year test commenced in 1981, Early indications are
that the program has been successful in meeting its goals.
The apparent success of this program led to a decision to
put the Pacific Fleet AFSs into phased maintenance and,
recently, the CNO authorized phased maintenance for reserve
FF—1052 class frigates, additional classes of auxiliary
ships, and some classes of amphibious ships. All of this is
based on a very limited test of the AFSPMP. The three test
AFSs have completed seven of their phased maintenance SRAs
and have five more to go. Projections of total costs may
therefore be inaccurate due to some unforeseen cause. In
addition, the three program evaluations conducted thus far
have concentrated on manday costs. While there are several
12

good reasons -for measuring cost in terms o-f mandays o-f work
expended, it Mould have been use-ful for the program
evaluations to address dollar costs in more detail. A
stabilization or even a reduction in the total number of
mandays expended in maintaining an AFS may or may not
correspond to a reduction in the required dollar budget
level. Another potentially significant problem is the
application of the results, based solely on three AFSs, to
other classes of ships.
C. OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY OF THE ANALYSIS
The primary objective of the analysis will be to
determine if the AFS Phased Maintenance Program has been
successful in meeting its goals and if it is a cost-
effective alternative to the conventional maintenance of
AFSs.
In developing the analysis of the program this study
will concentrate on the total depot and intermediate level
maintenance costs for an Atlantic Fleet AFS for a five year
operating cycle. Four major cost estimates will be made to
aid in evaluating the performance of the phased maintenance
program. These cost estimates will be made for the
following alternative policies:
(1) FY 75-79 Conventional Maintenance Policy,
(2) FY 81-85 Conventional Maintenance Policy,
13

<3) FY SI -85 Phased Maintenance Policy, and
(4) FY 81-85 MSC Maintenance Policy.
The manday and dollar cost estimates for the -first policy
will be used as a baseline and represent the conventional
maintenance costs over a -five year cycle prior to phased
maintenance. The second set o-f estimates will be a
projection o-f the cost o-f conventional maintenance, as i-f
the AFSs had not entered phased maintenance. It assumes
there is a moderate amount o-f cost growth -from one cycle to
the next. The estimates -for the third policy will be
projections of the cycle manday and dollar costs of
maintaining an AFS under the AFSPMP. Finally, the fourth
will be an estimate of the dollar costs MSC would incur, if
an AFS was transferred to it. In addition to the point
estimates, confidence intervals for the manday and dollar
costs will be constructed whenever possible.
This study will focus on manday and dollar costs, ship
availability, and Casualty Report (CASREP) data in
quantitatively analyzing the benefits of the program.
Several nonquantif iable aspects of the program will also be
addressed. These include schedule stability, material
condition, training, and the port engineer concept. The
sensitivity of the total costs to the intermediate
maintenance costs and the scheduled and unscheduled depot
level costs will also be discussed.
14

A secondary objective of the analysis will be to
qualitatively investigate the advisability of the expansion
o-f the phased maintenance program to other auxiliary,
amphibious, and combatant ships, based on the results o-f
the AFSPMP. The CNO has already authorized phased
maintenance for some ship classes other than AFS's, but no
decisions have been made concerning major combatants.
D. CONTENTS
The following chapter of this thesis will briefly
describe the evolution of the conventional maintenance
philosophy. Chapter III will briefly review the applicable
results of several reports that indicate our present
maintenance policy for support ships may not be optimal.
The reports are: SPAMS Project; ft Study Of Ship Overhaul
and Maintenance i by Cooper and Company; A Comparison of
Manning Options for the AO— 177 Class Fleet Oiler , by
Jeffrey Lee Flood ; and The Navy Overhaul Policy—A Costly
Means of Insuring Readiness For Support Ships , Report by
the Comptroller General (GAO) . Chapter IV will present a
mathematical formulation of the general Navy maintenance
optimization problem and discuss some of the reasons why
the Navy presently cannot analytically find an optimal way
to maintain its ships. A brief discussion of some of the
approaches that have been taken to solve scaled-down
versions of this problem will also be included. Chapter V
15

will describe the conventional, MSC, and AFS Phased
Maintenance Program maintenance policies. A direct
comparison of the latter two policies will also be
presented. Chapter VI will develop an evaluation o-f the AFS
Phased Maintenance Program (AFSPMP) . This will include an
analysis o-f the costs a-f the four alternative policies, an
analysis of the benefits of the AFSPMP, and a determination
of the degree to which the AFSPMP has met the objectives
that were established for it at the outset of the program.
Chapter VII will investigate the question of whether the
AFSPMP is a cost-effective alternative to conventional
maintenance. It also will address the expansion of the
phased maintenance p'rogram to other classes of auxilaries,
amphibious ships, and large combatants. Finally, Chapter




II. EVOLUTION OF THE CONVENTIONAL MAINTENANCE PHILOSOPHY
Decisions concerning the scheduling and execution o-f
depot level maintenance should be based on maintenance
strategies or philosophies. The e-f-fect of a particular
strategy on total costs, material condition, and ship
availability is at the center o-f the problem. How can the
Navy evaluate a potential strategy without actually
implementing it and recording the results? Although
improvements have been made, the Navy presently does not
have any good methods for accurately evaluating alternative
overhaul strategies. This either results in the Navy doing
nothing or it farces it to experiment at the ship level.
Historically, the Navy has been more concerned with the
improvement of ship material condition and overall
readiness as a result of a particular strategy rather than
the manday or dollar costs of sustaining that strategy. The
Navy undoubtedly has caused some overhaul cost growth as a
result of its maintenance philosophies.
During the early 1960's regular overhauls were
generally very short in duration, typically four months for
a destroyer, and involved only one-third or one—fourth the
number of mandays expended today CRef. 5: p. SI. A direct
comparison of past with present is, however, questionable
because of the differences in ship complexity, quality and
17

number in ship's crew, and so forth. Mhen the CNO
concluded, in the mid 1960 's, that the material condition
of the fleet was so poor ^ that it was not adequate for
national defense, efforts were made to remedy the situation
CRef. 5: p. 21.
The desire of senior military personnel to improve the
material condition of the fleet resulted in many changes to
the way in which maintenance, from the organizational level
to the depot level, is conducted today. The offshoots of
these efforts include, but are not limited to: an increase
in the power and importance of the Board of Inspection and
Survey (INSURV Board), which periodically inspects each
ship and documents all deficiencies in material condition;
establishment of a Propulsion Examination Board (PEB) to
aid in insuring that 1200 psi propulsion plants were safe
to operate; establishment of the Combat Systems Readiness
Review (CSRR) which is a weapon and communication systems
analog to the PEB; improvements in the Casualty Reporting
(CASREP) system (Ships must submit CASREPs whenever a
material deficiency or equipment failure occurs that
degrades one or more of the ship's mission areas and
requires outside assistance or more than ninety—six hours
to correct.); enhancement of the Maintenance Material
Management System (3M) ; formalization of Personnel
Qualification Standards (PQS) which specify the training
required for specific watchstations and provide a very
18

-formal framework for the documentation of individual
training accomplishments; and establishment of the Ship's
Force Overhaul Management System (SFOMS) which provides a
structure for scheduling and tracking ship's force work
during overhaul. CRef. 5: p. 2 3
Another major result of all of this was the basic
maintenance philosophy that prevails within the Navy today.
This philosophy is based on the "thorough" overhaul concept
which is defined as follows:
"Upon completion of overhaul, a ship shall be
ready for unrestricted war service. All regular
overhauls shall be planned to accomplish all
outstanding repairs and major maintenance to
ensure reasonably reliable material readiness and
operations during the succeeding operational
cycle." CRef. 5: p. 3 3
For some time the overhaul programming and budgeting
personnel have not been able to provide enough funds to
complete all of the work requested for Navy ship overhauls.
Cost growth due to ship age and fleet modernization does
not account for all of the increase in the cost to overhaul
ships. One fundamental problem is that under the thorough
overhaul policy the people who plan the overhauls and
produce the Ship Alteration and Repair Packages (SARPs)
,
part of the initial documentation of what will be
accomplished during a specific overhaul, are guided more by
risk avoidance than they are constrained by fiscal matters.
The end result of risk avoidance is
"the inclusion of numerous 'insurance items' in
the overhaul package, items of repair work for
19

Mhich there is no current indication of impending
failure, but which are believed needed to ensure
the ships's ability to maintain reliable
operations throughout its operating cycle." CRe-f.
5: p. 31 :
The emphasis placed on this strategy resulted in the more
-formal way in which the Navy currently plans for an
overhaul. It also required more lead-time for the planning
process due to the scope of work that is accomplished
during overhauls. Typically the work to be accomplished is
identified a year or more in advance of the scheduled
overhaul start date. Unfortunately, this can lead to
inclusion of everything that is known to require overhaul
attention as well as many items that are not.
There is some question as to whether or not further
increases in the mandays or dollars expended on an
overhaul, beyond present levels, will result in additional
improvements in material condition. In fact, some analysts
argue that the Navy is already past the point of
diminishing returns and that maintenance budgets should be
reduced substantially. There is considerable evidence which
indicates the thorough overhaul concept is not an optimal
way to conduct the depot level maintenance of Navy ships.
Some of the studies addressing that issue are briefly
described in the next chapter. As a consequence of these
studies and the ever rising costs of ship overhauls, today
there is increasing enthusiasm for adoption of so—called
progressive maintenance strategies. These strategies are
20

based on depot maintenance availabilities that are shorter
in duration and occur more -frequently. It is thought that
this kind o-f system will result in less conservative
planning for depot level maintenance, there-fore reducing
the number o-f unwarranted risk avoidance work requests.
21

III. INDICATIONS THAT THE CONVENTIONAL MAINTENANCE POLICY
IS NOT OPTIMAL
The only pertinent studies that address the AFS Phased
Maintenance Program are the program evaluation reports that
are produced by the Amphibious and Combat Support Ship
Logistic Division of the Surface Ships Directorate of the
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA 911), in conjunction with
American Management Systems, Inc. Three formal reports have
been published to date. The most recent one was published
in August 1983 and is titled AFS Phased Maintenance
Program, Third Formal Evaluation Report . These reports are
not summarized or discussed in this chapter because
portions of them will be used as sources of data and
information in Chapters V through VII.
Several studies, however, have addressed the fact that
during the early 1970 's the Navy's cost of maintaining a
fleet oiler (AO) were far greater than the corresponding
costs for MSC tankers/fleet oilers, and enormously greater
than the costs for commercial ships CRef. 2: p. 103- This
result was particularly important in studies that have
focused on the question of ci vil ianization of some classes
of auxiliary ships. The Government Accounting Office (GAO)
and the Congress have also used results from these studies
to help document their claims that the Navy is wasting
22

resources by using its present overhaul philosophy. Several
o-f these studies will now be examined in detail.
A. SOAMS PROJECT: A STUDY OF SHIP OVERHAUL AND MAINTENANCE
The Ship Overhaul and Maintenance Study (SOAMS) was
conducted by Cooper and Company -from January 1973 to
November 1975. The study was designed to -find ways to
reduce Navy maintenance costs, without reducing the
performance o-f ships, and was done in four major steps: (1)
Phase I: Demonstration Approach; (2) Phase II: Reducing
Costs o-f Navy AO Overhauls; (3) E-ffects o-f Implementation;
and (4) Plans for Test and Evaluation. The first two steps
are of particular interest so the basic methodology and
results are briefly discussed in the following paragraphs.
1. Phase I; Demonstration Approach
The objective of this phase was to demonstrate an
approach to finding improvements in fleet maintenance. The
basic approach was to study the costs and ship performance
for several organizations with broadly different
maintenance policies. Cooper and Company chose to do this
by analyzing data for USN fleet oilers (AOs) , MSC tankers,
and commercial tankers from a U.S. oil company. Some of the
differences among the three sets of ships were identified
and appropriate adjustments to the data made. Table I
summarizes their findings with respect to overhaul costs
and ship performance. Based on their numerical results
23

Cooper and Company stated,
"The costs of maintaining an AO, at any level o-f
design detail, are far greater than the
corresponding costs of an MSC tanker, and
enormously greater than the costs of maintaining
a commercial tanker; and this is true whether we
consider overhaul costs alone, or interoverhaul
costs alone, or the sum of the two. At the same
time AGs have more CASREPs, as well as lower
availability." CRef. 2: pp. 2-4]
It was also reported that the average time between
overhauls was 42 months for USN ships, 18,5 months for MSC
ships, and 22 months for commercial ships. The results were
based on a study of 14 AOs, 19 MSC tankers, and 9
commercial tankers CRef. 2; pp. 3—6 3.
TABLE I
SOAMS Project—Phase I Findings
Ratio Comparisons of Cost and Performance
MEASURES OF COST RATIO OF AOs RATIO OF AOs







ON BOARD CREW 4.5*
ON BOARD MAT. 'S N/A
PERFORMANCE:
(1) SHIP DOWNTIME
DUE TO OVERHAUL 1.8
DUE TO OTHER REPAIRS 3.8
(2) SHIP AVAILABILITY .91










Minimum crew ratios vary between 3 and 6, depending
on class of ship.
»« CASREPs rated 3 and 4 generally seriously degrade oni
or more mission areas.
CRef. 2: p. 3 3
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2. Phase II; Reducing Costs of Navy AO Overhauls
The di-fference in overhaul costs revealed in Phase
I were hypothesized to be due to one or more of three
factors: (1) differences in the physical conditions of the
ships at the beginning of an overhaul, including differ
—
ences due to operating tempo, design, or interoverhaul
maintenance; (2) differences in overhaul planning, that is,
the processes that determine what work will be performed
once the ship goes into overhaul; and (3) differences in
the shipyards conducting the actual overhauls. Cooper and
Company felt it was necessary to establish the source of
the differences in overhaul costs before they made any
specific recommendations for ways to reduce costs. The
basic approach was to identify MSC and USN ships that were
in very nearly identical physical condition and compare the
overhaul costs for that set of ships. This included having
MSC prepare overhaul estimates on the Navy military manned
ships. The major finding for Phase II was that in situ-
ations where the physical conditions were identical, the
Navy overhaul costs were two times those of MSC and five
times those of the oil company CRef. 2: p. 10 3. They
concluded that
"The comparisons make it virtually certain that
the overhaul cost differences observed in Phase I
between the three jurisdictions must be due to
(1) overhaul planning and implementation
differences and (2) differences in physical
conditions. It is also clear that both effects
aire substantial." CRef. 2: p. 14 3
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B. A COMPARISON OF MANNING OPTIONS FOR THE AO-177 CLASS
FLEET OILER
This study Mas performed by Lieutenant Commander J.L.
Flood while a student at the Naval Postgraduate School. It
was submitted in October 1982, in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for a degree of Master Of Science in
Management. The study developed comparative life cycle
costs for the Navy military and Navy military-conversion to
civil service manning options for the AO-177 class fleet
oiler. The comparison revealed that the primary difference
between the total annual costs for the two manning options
was due to maintenance. The total annualized depot and
intermediate level maintenance cost under military manning
was estimated to be more than two times that of the civil
service manning option CRef. 6: pp. 32-35 3.
C. THE NAVY OVERHAUL POLICY—A COSTLY MEANS OF INSURING
READINESS FOR SUPPORT SHIPS
This analysis was conducted by the General Accounting
Office (GAO) at the request of the House Committee on
Appropriations. The request was made 19 October 1977 and
the results were published 27 December 197B. The committee
requested that GAO: (1) compare maintenance practices for
U.S. Navy auxiliary and amphibious ships, with civilian
American flag commercial ships, and (2) obtain and compare
statistical data on overhaul costs and maintenance
practices for U.S. Navy ships overhauled in private yards
26

with those for similar cominercial ships. The GAO study was
primarily an analysis of differential expenditures and did
not fully address the cost-effectiveness of the various
maintenance policies examined.
The GAO reported that the Navy's maintenance costs per
ship average about two million dollars as opposed to about
four—hundred thousand for a similar commercial ship. Much
of the report was devoted to discussing some of the reasons
for such a great difference. They briefly described the
differences in the missions of the ships and the fact that,
since Navy ships are designed to operate in combat
environments, they are equipped with many battle systems
and armaments, large crews, and extensive backup systems.
GAO concluded that
"though we had problems in obtaining valid data,
the cost differences are so marked that no
refinement of data or approach can significantly
alter the broad finding—that the Navy spends
more maintaining its ships, including specific
equipment." CRef. 7: p. 13
The GAQ also addressed the issue of what equipment
reliability is needed for support ships. They stated that
the Navy does not adequately assess the likelihood of
equipment failure and that
"... without these detailed assessments, the Navy
has adopted a philosophy of high-cost overhauls
to better insure reliability during operating
cycles. As a result, equipment that is operating
satisfactorily or with only minor problems may be
overhauled." CRef. 7: pp. 11-12:
27

This led to a discussion o-f reliability centered
maintenance, which has been used with success by civilian
aircraft companies. The basic premise of this maintenance
philosophy is that scheduled maintenance is not always
effective, desirable, or economical. The basic principle is
to perform only those maintenance tasks that are necessary
to retain design levels of safety and reliability. This
concept requires that each maintenance task that has been
determined to be required or desirable is classified as
either "fixed frequency" or "on-condition maintenance." The
remaining maintenance items Sire designated for "condition
monitoring." Fixed frequency maintenance applies to those
equipments or components which demonstrate a predictable
relationship between age and reliability degradation. The
items are generally removed and then replaced or overhauled
at some maximum time interval. Qn—condition maintenance
applies to items for which periodic inspections or tests
can determine their condition. Maintenance is then
scheduled as dictated by the inspections or tests.
Condition monitoring refers to those equipments or
components that are not subject to an effective maintenance
action. The failure history of this type of equipment is
monitored and evaluated for possible reclassification or
redesign. CRef. 7: p. 153
Reliability centered maintenance is especially
effective when one considers that many types of equipment
28

fail with an exponential probability distribution. Items
that fail exponentially exhibit a very interesting
memoryless property. This means that the conditional
probability distribution of the failure of an item at some
time t is the same as the unconditional probability
distribution of the item at time zero, or at any other
time. For example, assume that lightbulbs fail
exponentially. Then, the probability that a lightbulb fails
during the next fifty hours of operation, given that it is
brand new, is the same as the probability that it fails
during the next fifty hours, given that the bulb has been
burning for five-hundred hours. In addition, if the mean
corresponding to the probability distribution is 1000
hours, then at any point in time the expected life
remaining in the lightbulb is 1000 hours. This implies that
overhauling or replacing an equipment or component will not
provide any additional reliability. The results of ongoing
research in the airline community provide an example of
this. Figure 1 shows the age-reliability relationships from
a United Airlines study. It indicates that ninety-four
percent of the components examined do not require periodic
overhauls.
Statement of Mr. Tom Matteson, Consultant, Maintenance
and Systems Failures, Airline Community, before the Senate




















Figure 1 Age—Rel iabi lity Relationships from a
United Airlines Study
D. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING NAVY OVERHAUL COSTS
The three studies briefly described above, as well as
many others, strongly indicate that the Navy spends more
money overhauling its ships than do MSC and commercial
operators. However, there may be good reasons for the
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higher costs, so the real question is whether those higher
costs are justified. The differences in the design of the
ships, missions, crew size and experience, and type of
operations must all be weighed very carefully. Despite the
fact that the basic mission of MSC fleet oilers is the same
as Navy military manned fleet oilers (AOs) , the ships are
operated in very different ways. In comparing Navy ships to
commercial tankers, great care must be taken to control for
differences in ships, missions, and operations. An often
stated criticism of the Navy is that it spends more than
MSC or commercial shipowners to maintain its ships yet
keeps them at sea for a smaller percentage of the year.
Those statements, however, do not consider the fact that
the amount of time a ship is underway has a direct
influence, both positive. and negative, on the maintenance
costs. Many naval officers have observed that ships "run
best" when they do a lot of steaming. The point is that the
differences between the ships being compared may partially
or totally invalidate the comparisons that have been made.
Since there is a strong indication that the Navy may be
able to find a better maintenance policy than the one it is
currently using, why cannot the Navy simply input the
applicable variables into a computer, generate a solution
to the problem, and print out the optimal policy that it




IV. THE NAVY SHIP OVERHAUL OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
The Navy ship overhaul problem is an extremely
complicated optimization problem that has not yet been
fully salved. The abjective of the problem is to find an
optimal strategy for maintaining ships in a high state of
readiness without incurring unreasonable costs. In the
broadest sense, the Navy is interested in optimally
determining how much work to accomplish during each
overhaul, the duration of each overhaul, the overhaul
frequency, and the amount of interoverhaul depot level
maintenance to perform. It should be noted that these
decisions are not independent of each other. Overhauls
scheduled for long periods of time are much less likely
than short ones to be completed on time and on budget.
Reducing the scope of overhauls and hence the cost may
conceivably result in increased failure rates and,
subsequently, an increase in the frequency of emergency
repairs. In addition to the high cost of emergency repairs
a ship may not be available for an operation, which may
itself impose additional costs. There are also direct
ramifications of these decisions with regard to Navy force
levels. The overhaul duration and the time between
overhauls roughly establish an upper limit on the overall
availability of a ship. This directly influences the number
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o-f ships the Navy must have in commissian to satisfy
specific requirements to meet national security objectives.
A very important indirect result of all of this is the
material condition of a ship now and in the future, Without
proper planning and careful attention to detail it is
possible to inadequately maintain a ship but not find out
about it for several years. Wars typically require that
ships be deployed for extended periods of time resulting in
postponed and/or cancelled overhauls. Although the ships
involved are generally able to meet their wartime
commitments it is not unusual for their material condition
to slowly deteriorate, resulting in less capable ships
after some period of time.
A. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION
The primary purpose of this formulation is to give the
reader a feeling for the complexity of the ship overhaul
problem. It will also be a useful tool later in this study
for discussing the cost-effectiveness of one maintenance
policy compared to another. The formulation here is
considerably less complex than would be required in the
real world but it does provide a good starting point.
The objective of the formal optimization problem is to
allocate depot and intermediate level maintenance budgets
and determine the duration and frequency of overhauls for a





given a series of relatively inflexible
constraints. The basic -formulation could easily be revised
so that one ship only is considered or generalized to
include entire classes or -fleets of ships. The following
variables are defined for the purposes of the formulation:
MOE — measure of effectiveness for the group of ships,
N - number of ships in the group,
OD - duration of an overhaul,
OF - overhaul frequency,
BT - total dollar budget available for intermediate
and depot level work for the N ships,
Bi - dollars budgeted for ship i,
DT - total depot level mandays available for the N
ships,
DOi - depot level mandays of work scheduled for
ship i during an overhaul,
DBi - depot level mandays of work scheduled for
ship i between overhauls,
IT - total Intermediate Maintenance Activity <IMA)
mandays available for the N ships,
li — IMA mandays of work scheduled for ship i between
overhauls,
CMO — mandays of organizational level maintenance
performed by ship's crew during overhaul,
CMB - mandays of organizational level maintenance
performed by ship's crew between overhauls,
AV — percentage of total time ship is available for
fleet operations,
CA - casualty reports (CASREPs) per unit time,
TR — training status,
SCH - required schools and off-ship training,
R - reliability (probability ship completes fleet
operations without mission degrading casualties,
given all systems are up at the start of
operations)
,
FMP - accomplishment of fleet modernization SHIPALTs
(ship alterations)
,
LV - leave and liberty, and
AGE - ship age.
The units of measurement are not specified for some of the
variables because it is not clear what that measure would
be in the real world. As indicated in the definitions
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above, subscript i refers to ship i. An additional
subscript for re-ferring to individual ships is required for
clarity. In the formulation beloM subscript j refers to the
amount of a particular attribute possessed by ship j and
subscript o refers to a specified minimum or maximum level
of that attribute. Then the optimization problem may be
formally stated as:
MAXIMIZE : MOE = f (OD,aF,BT,Bi ,DT,DOi ,DBi , IT, li ,CMOj
,
CMOo , CMBj , CMBo , AV j , AVo , CA j , CAo
,
TRj , TRo , SCH j , SCHo , R j , Ro , FMP j , FMPo
LVj,LVo,AGEj,AGEo) i,j = 1,...,N
SUBJECT TO : (1) TOTAL DOLLAR BUDGET
E Bi <= BT
(2) DEPOT/IMA FACILITIES
r DOi + sum DBi <= DT
















The mathematical formulation above basically states
that the Navy should maximize the "effectiveness" of its
ships subject to the following constraints: (1) the total
dollars expended on the ships must not exceed the allocated
budget; (2) the total depot and total intermediate level
mandays expended to maintain the ships must not exceed the
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mandays available; (3) the amount o-f maintenance that can
be per-formed by the ship's crew is physically limited by
the number in the crew, watchstanding duties, training,
leave and liberty, etcetera. Ship's crew may or may not be
able to accomplish Jobs that are not completed at the depot
or intermediate levels; (4) each ship must be available to
meet scheduled commitments; (5) when available -For fleet
operations each ship must be capable o-f performing its
assigned missions—the equipment must be operational and
the ship's crew must be trained to use it (team training
aboard ship and schools ashore); (6) the probability that a
ship can complete fleet operations, without suffering
mission degrading equipment casual i ties, must be
sufficiently high; (7) designated fleet modernization
SHIPALTs for habitability and weapon system updates must be
completed; and <S) the ship's crew must be given a
reasonable opportunity for leave and liberty while inport.
Extended deprivation of leave and liberty can lead to poor
morale, serious readiness problems aboard a particular
ship, and lower retention of personnel in the Navy. Low
retention may affect the quantity and quality of shipboard
personnel, resulting in ships that are degraded in their
ability to perform their mission.
The objective function of the optimization problem was
defined as a very nonspecific MOE that is a function of
many variables. This was the simplest way to indicate the
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complexity o-f the objective function without making
assumptions about the actual -format and -functional
relationships. The values for the constraints would be
fixed at the appropriate level of decision making. Some of
the constraints are the result of physical limitations
while others could be interpreted as goals that the Navy is
striving to achieve. The constraints are not exhaustive and
serve only to indicate the variety of factors that
constrain the optimization problem. Several confounding
aspects of the optimization problem are addressed in the
following section.
B. SOLUTION DIFFICULTIES
The mathematical formulation above is not specific
regarding the objective function and the constraint
equations. One cannot mathematically determine the optimal
solution to the problem and promulgate a new maintenance
policy because of the inability to specify intervariable
relationships and establish a valid set of functional forms
for the MOE and constraint equations. Optimal ity
considerations will be discussed in more detail later in
this chapter.
1 . Measures of Effectiveness
One major problem that is repeatedly encountered in
attempting to solve this and related problems is defining
an adequate measure of effectiveness (MOE) . An MOE is a
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quantitative assessment o-f the degree to Mhich the
objective o-f an analysis is satisfied. It is used to
compare the effectiveness of alternative courses of action
in achieving the stated objective. The MOE is extremely-
critical in terms of producing meaningful results from any
attempt to solve the problem.
Raisbeck CRef. S; pp. 85-86 3 details a way of
determining a measure of effectiveness that is particularly
appropriate for the optimization problem above. The basic
methodology is to analyze the parallels between
mathematical or other representations and the real world.
If the analyst has a sufficient understanding of the
problem this may result in the establishment of valid
functional relationships.
It is generally straightforward to make
proportionality or sign statements about each of the
variables included in the objective function stated in the
problem formulation. However, actual determination of a set
of valid functional forms and their associated weights is
extremely difficult. This is due to the fact that Navy
analysts presently do not understand the intricacies of all
of the interactions among the variables included in the
objective function. In addition, there Are many different
views on how to measure ship effectiveness.
In the past, many different MOEs have been
proposed. Kline CRef. 9: p. 8 3 quoted Wei ker and Home's
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early 1960 's statement that "System Effectiveness is the
probability the system can meet an operational demand
within a given time when operated under specific
conditions." Kline CRef. 9: p. 83 also reported that Von
Alven expressed this definition of system effectiveness as
the product of three probabilities: (1) the probability
that the system is either operating satisfactorily or can
be placed in demand at any random point in time; (2) the
conditional probability that the system will operate for
the duration of the mission, given that it was operable at
the start of the mission; and (3) the probability that the
system can meet mission requirements, given that it is
operating within its design specifications. This seems to
be a very applicable liOE and may take into consideration
all of the influencing factors that were defined in the
formulation. It would, however, be extremely difficult to
make the required numerical determination of the
probabilities.
Most of the recent studies use the availability of
the ship or the total maintenance cost as the MOE but this
author believes this forces too simplistic a problem and
results in less than adequate (and useful) results. It
should be noted that, in fact, very few studies have
attempted to address more than one or two aspects of this
problem at a time. There are many more factors of interest
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and importance that cannot be validly detached from the
problem.
2. Con-founding Aspects
In addition to the MOE problems that must be
resolved there are several additional, yet unspecified,
confounding aspects of the overhaul problem. Six of these
are briefly addressed in this chapter. Although the six
items mentioned below are not exhaustive, they do give some
feeling for the kinds of things that influence overhaul
policy decisions. Some of these are basically constraints
to the optimization problem if the ship has not yet been
designed and constructed.
a. System Reliability
The design of every ship is based in part on
system reliability specifications. Clearly, a relationship
exists between the reliability of a system (an entire ship)
and the cost to maintain it.
b. System Maintainability
Maintenance requirements, for depot or
intermediate level work, certainly depend on the way in
which the various equipments were designed to be
maintained.
c. Ship Age
There is some indication that as a ship ages it
costs more to keep it performing to the required
specifications. In addition, maintenance costs in any
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particular year are generally not independent o-f the
maintenance policies that may have been in ef-fect during
previous years. Likewise, the prior utilization or
employment o-f a ship may have a signi-ficant impact on
current maintenance costs.
Another interesting and potentially confounding
aspect regarding ship age is the intended service life of a
ship. This can obscure the underlying differences among
various alternative maintenance policies. It also confounds
the selected MOE because Navy ships are routinely operated
past the typical thirty year life for which they were
designed. It is not unreasonable to expect that ships
operated well past their expected life may cost more to
maintain and may be somewhat less capable than when they
were new.
d. Standards and Regulations
Safety, engineering, and general maintenance
standards and regulations periodically change throughout
the operational life of a ship. A good example of this is
the creation and operation of the Propulsion Examination
Board (PEB)
.
e. Fleet Modernization Program
Ships periodically are updated or augmented
with new weapon systems and often improvements in
habitability are made. Some alterations consist of
replacing outdated or inoperable equipments with new ones;
41

there-fore, the need -for repair work may be reduced. Ship
alterations (SHIPALTs) also may have a substantial impact
on the future requirements for maintenance and repair.
f. Politics
Another problem that makes the Navy's overhaul
problem more difficult to solve is the influence of
non-Navy constituencies. These constituencies impact upon
the Navy in areas such as the environment, social welfare,
and labor and business. In studying the evolution of
surface ship overhauls American Management Systems, Inc.
concluded that
"... the Congress, in its role as representative
of special interest groups and as a source of
budgetary decision—making, is increasingly
involved in the management of the ship overhaul
process. In part, this is in support of social
programs such as ensuring that small businesses
receive a substantial share of ship overhaul
work. Part has been dictated by the perceived
decline of the U.S. shipyard industry. In many
cases, regional economic considerations influence
work allocation. Whatever the social consequences
of involvement by the Congress, the results for
the Navy are reduction of its flexibility to
manage the ship overhaul program in its own best
interest, and probably creation of some major
cost disadvantages as well." CRef. 5: p. 413
It is reasonable to conclude that the political pressures
associated with military fiscal matters result in an
additional set of potentially confounding variables.
3. Data Dependence
Another major difficulty is that most approaches to
solving the optimization problem require an extensive data
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base. The data base must incorporate many observations and
preferably they should represent a variety of overhaul and
interoverhaul durations. In addition, as a model is made
more complex and, hopefully, more meaningful, the
dependence on data generally becomes greater.
Although extensive ship maintenance data is
available, in reality these data are the result of
relatively few maintenance policies. This results in the
so-called "out of range" problem. Many statistical methods
require data for estimates of equation coefficients,
transition probabilities, and functional relationships.
When evaluating alternative maintenance policies that are
not represented in the data base, the validity and
reliability of these estimates are questionable due to the
out of range problem.
C. SOLUTION APPROACHES
Many attempts have been made to analytically address
the optimization problem. By necessity, however, all have
been attempts to solve somewhat restricted versions of the
problem. Although it would be nice to be able to directly
generate an optimal maintenance policy, salving the
scaled-down problems is beneficial in two ways. First of
all, until one can solve the "easier" problems it does not
make much sense to expend a lot of energy trying to solve
the harder ones. Therefore, these smaller problems can be
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likened to stepping stones. Secondly, the results of the
scaled—down versions of the problem are interesting in
their own right and do provide some useful information.
There are many ways to approach the scaled-down
versions of the optimization problem. Four basic approaches
that have received much attention are presented below.
1 . Regression Analysis
Without a doubt, the primary thrust of research in
this area using regression techniques has been in
developing cost estimating relationships (CERs)
.
Statistically sound CERs that relate overhaul dollar and
manday costs to overhaul duration, overhaul frequency, and
other variables clearly have the potential to aid in
solving the larger optimization problem by helping to
specify intervariable relationships.
The Center for Naval Analyses has conducted a
significant amount of research in this area. Their report
on ship overhaul cost estimating relationships (SOCERs)
received much attention and revealed many interesting
things about the general problem. For example, they state,
"Analysis of overhaul data covering fiscal years 1962-1972
indicates that increased overhaul costs were not associated
with longer (interoverhaul ) intervals, with the exception
of aircraft carriers." CRef. 10: p. iii] This was not an
intuitively obvious result. Since their research was
conducted on combatants and is now eight years old one may
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question the validity of their conclusions with respect to
the situation under analysis here. In addition, even if
less frequent overhauls are not associated with increased
overhaul costs, they may be associated with increases in
other maintenance costs.
The most significant problem with approaches using
regression analysis is the dependence on historical data.
The reliability of an estimate from a regression equation
may be questionable when the values for the inputed
variables are beyond the sample range. This may be due to
one or both of two factors: (1) it is quite possible that
the regression equation does not hold beyond the range of
the data; and (2) values beyond the range of the data may
be from a different population than the original data CRef.
11: p. 46 3. Another significant limitation is that although
the CERs might do very well in describing how the
independent and dependent variables were related in the
past, there may be unrepresented and potentially
confounding variables that could invalidate the regression
model
.
One particularly appealing method that could be
applied to this problem was presented in a course on test
and evaluation at the Naval Postgraduate School by
Professor G.F. Lindsay. The basic method involves merging
expert opinion with regression techniques. This method
could be extremely useful in determining how ship
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maintenance and readiness experts -feel about the assarted
variables in the objective function of the optimization
problem. The goal would be to explicitly define the
mathematical form of the MOE. For this situation a survey
(questionnaire) would be prepared and distributed to
experts. The survey would contain a presentation of the
numerical values for each of the variables included in the
objective function for as many maintenance policies and
ships as passible. The judges would be asked to do
numerical ratings, rankings, categorical judgements, or the
constant sum method. The resulting scaled values for the
MOE, which would be on an interval or ratio scale, would
then be used as the dependent variable (as cost was in the.
SOGER study) for a regression analysis. The resulting
regression equation could be used to determine the value of
the MOE under a variety of alternative maintenance
policies. This method is appealing because it incorporates
both expert opinion and accepted statistical analysis.
2. Markov Process
Another interesting way to approach the problem is
through stochastic models. Within the general framework of
stochastics, the most appropriate method seems to be Markov
processes. A scaled-down version of the Navy overhaul
problem has been successfully modeled using transient
Markov processes. Eldred CRef. 12 D developed a set of
increasingly general models that resulted in a reasonable
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way to evaluate maintenance policies. The -Final and most
complex model was able to accomodate inputs for ship age,
material condition, and elapsed time out of overhaul. The
development of these models was very complex and beyond the
scope of this chapter. The description of the model is
therefore brief and in general terms.
In the most complex model, Eldred established four
levels of material condition, three categories for time
since overhaul, and three categories for ship age. He then
estimated transition probabilites using historical data
from destroyer type ships.
The model was somewhat flexible in that it was able
to evaluate a wide range of maintenance policies. The
results of the study indicate that the Markov process was a
reasonable way to describe the changing material condition
of ships over time and how the overhauls affected it.
Although this model has much potential for evaluating
alternative maintenance policies it suffers from the same
limitations as most other models. The first limitation is
that one must be able to either subjectively or
quantitatively categorize a ship's material condition. The
second is that the model is not valid unless the transition
probabilities Are accurate and reliable. Transition
probabilities must be computed using historical data or
assumed through some kind of subjective evaluation. The use
of historical data may result in out of range problems
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similar to those that can be encountered in regression
analysis.
3. Dynamic Programming
Dynamic programming is a very good solution
strategy for the problem at hand. Using this approach,
recursive equations are derived that allow one to solve the
problem one step at a time. Jardine CRef. 13: pp. llS-125 3
developed a basic dynamic program that he called: "optimal
overhaul /repair/replace maintenance policy for equipment
subject to breakdown : finite time horizon." The basic
model accomodates either a good or failed state of
equipment, a series of possible maintenance actions that
can be taken during a period, and transition probabilities
for describing the probability that the equipment will go
from state i to state j in one period if maintenance action
"a" is taken. It also incorporates the cost of transition
from one state to another. The objective of the program was
to minimize the total cost of maintenance over n time
periods.
The model can easily be generalized to accomodate
the overhaul problem. The number of discrete material
condition states can be expanded to any reasonable number
and stochastic extensions (for increasing probabilities of
failure, etcetera) can easily be incorporated in the model.
The model is not, however, without limitations. It also is
very dependent on accurate and complete historical data for
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determination o-f the transition probabilities. The model
also requires some method for discretizing the material
condition of a ship, based on the available data.
4. Trial and Error
The best way to utilize the trial and error
approach is to conduct a completely valid scientific
experiment. Ideally, some of the ships would be identified
as test ships and others as control ships. All factors
would then be held constant with the exception of the
maintenance policy. In addition, a large number of control
and test ships would be used to reduce the variance of the
statistics used to describe the results of the experiment.
This cannot realistically be accomplished by the Navy due
to the sheer magnitude and scope of the problem. It is
useful, however, for* the Navy to adhere to as many of the
basic principles as possible.
Professor G.F. Lindsay defines an experiment as a
series of controlled observations taken in an artificial
environment, with deliberate manipulation of some
variables, in order to answer one or more specific
questions. He also maintains that all experiments are
artificial in that: (1) they are created by people; (2)
people in experiments behave unnaturally; and (3) the
presence of an experimenter imposes an artificial flavor on
the test. In planning any experiment or test program the
experimenter should consider the populations to which the
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results Are supposed to pertain. In addition, the
experimental design should produce an estimate o-F the
property being tested and the experimental error.
As previously stated, the Navy's primary method -for
evaluating potential maintenance strategies has been
through actual implementation (experimentation). A very
good example of this is the AFS Phased Maintenance Program
(AFSPMP)
. Unfortunately, these test programs are not
generally conducted as scientific experiments. For example,
the AFSPMP uses the same three Atlantic Fleet AFSs as both
the test and control ships. The current five year operating
cycle is considered for the test ships and the previous
five year operating cycle for the control ships. It is
doubtful that all factors other than the maintenance policy
have been held constant. The use of a nonscientif ic
experiment may lead to possible questions concerning the
validity and applicability of the results.
D. OPTIMALITY CONSIDERATIONS
One should recall that in the broadest sense, the Navy
is interested in optimally determining how much work to
accomplish during each overhaul, the duration of each
overhaul , the overhaul frequency, and the amount of
interoverhaul depot level maintenance to perform. These are
the basic decision variables for the optimization problem.
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In order to discuss the optimal ity o-f a maintenance
policy two definitions are required. In terms of the -formal
optimization problem a solution is feasible if and only if
the eight sets of constraints are satisfied. A trial
optimal solution X* is a global maximum for the
optimization if and only if for all feasible X:
MOE(X*) >= MOE(X).
Unfortunately, in real world problems such as the Navy
overhaul problem it is often the case that one or more of
the constraints are violated. The FY 75-79 conventional
policy is a good example of this. One may recall that a
primary objective of the AFSPMP was to minimize the
duration of depot level maintenance periods to facilitate
keeping one of the AFSs forward deployed at all times. This
was driven by an unequal sharing of deployments prior to
the implementation of phased maintenance. Precise
availability figures are not required to speculate that the
conventional policy probably violated constraint four, the
scheduled commitment constraint, and possibly five and six,
the readiness and reliability constraints, as well.
The determination or assessment that a particular
policy is optimal also requires the functional form of the
objective function and constraints to be known. Since the
Navy has not been able to do this, the optimal ity of the




The only reasonable conclusion that can be reached
after an intensive review o-f the literature is that the
Navy presently does not have the ability to completely
solve its overhaul optimization problem. This does not mean
that the Navy should be held culpable for its inability to
solve the problem. Indeed, the complexity of the
optimization problem is such that it may never be solved. A
major difficulty is that the Navy does not have enough data
or knowledge to establish the relationships in the
constraints and MDEs.
Due to the Navy's inability to reliably predict the
consequences of alternative maintenance policies, the Navy
is left with only one course of action: implement a
maintenance policy and analyze the results to see if it is
any better than the previous one. This is what the AFS
Phased Maintenance Program (AFSPMP) test bed attempts to
do: implement a maintenance policy similar to the one
employed by the Military Seal if t Command (MSC) and see if
it meets the established goals. The following chapter will
describe the conventional, MSC, and AFSPMP maintenance
policies. A direct comparison of the latter two policies
will also be presented.
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V. OVERVIEW OF CONVENTIONAL, MSC, AND AFSPMP
MAINTENANCE POLICIES
Chapter II described the evolution o-f the thorough
overhaul concept, which forms the basis -for the
conventional maintenance policy that is applied to most of
the surface fleet. Chapter III reviewed several pertinent
studies that strongly indicate the Navy may be able to find
a better maintenance policy for its support ships. The
conclusion reached in Chapter IV was that the Navy
currently has only one method for reliably evaluating
alternative maintenance policies—implement a trial optimal
policy and analyze the results. Such a trial maintenance
policy was authorized by the Navy in 1979 for Atlantic
Fleet AFSs and is called the AFS Phased Maintenance Program
(AFSPMP)
.
The remainder of this chapter will briefly describe the
conventional. Military Sealift Command (MSC) , and AFSPMP
maintenance policies. A direct comparison of the MSC and
AFSPMP policies will also be presented since the AFSPMP was
modeled after MSC maintenance practices. The purpose of
this chapter is to give the reader additional background
information to aid in understanding and interpreting the




The conventional maintenance policy is based on the
thorough overhaul concept that was discussed in Chapter II.
The premise o-f this policy is that
"Upon completion of overhaul, a ship shall be
ready -for unrestricted war service. All regular
overhauls shall be planned to accomplish all
outstanding repairs and major maintenance to
ensure reasonably reliable material readiness and
operations during the succeeding operational
cycle." CRe-f. 5: p. 33
This policy is therefore predicated on risk avoidance. The
major elements of the conventional maintenance policy are
described in the paragraphs below.
A conventional maintenance policy is generally charac-
terized by a long overhaul, typically four to twelve
months, followed by a long period of operations, usually
three to eight years. For some classes of ships periodic
Selected Restricted Availabilities (SRAs) are scheduled
between overhauls. Unscheduled depot level maintenance, in
the form of voyage repairs or Restricted Availabilities
(RAVs) , may also be required. Intermediate Maintenance
Availabilities (IMAVs) are also scheduled periodically and
the ship's crew performs organizational preventive and
corrective maintenance. The AFSs, under the conventional
policy, were scheduled for overhauls of four months dura-
tion, and overhaul intervals of fifty—four to sixty months
CRef. 14 3. It should be noted, however, that each of the
last two regular overhauls completed under the conventional
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policy were approximately seven months long (see Table B-1
in Appendix B) . The AFSs were scheduled -for IMAVs but not
•for SRAs. Organizational level maintenance and unscheduled
depot level maintenance were conducted as necessary.
Another important aspect of this maintenance policy is
the planning structure. The thorough overhaul concept
resulted in the ship and various shore facilities starting
to plan for an upcoming overhaul at least one year in
advance. It also resulted in attempts to standardize
overhauls, through the preauthorization of repair work, to
aid in predicting required manday and dollar costs, allow
time to order materials that are difficult to obtain, and
to make the planning and execution process work more
smoothly. The baseline Ship Alteration and Repair Package
(SARP) , developed by the Planning and Engineering for
Repairs and Alterations (PERA) organization, is used as an
initial list of repairs. In addition, there are ship-
generated work requests for items desired to be included in
the overhaul package. The Navy also conducts a very
extensive, time—consuming Pre-Overhaul Test and Inspection
(POT & I ) of the ship and makes recommendations about the
work that should be performed. These recommendations are
then merged with the baseline SARP and ship's force work
requests to form the preliminary SARP. The preliminary SARP
provides a foundation for the overhaul package. In the end,
three other SARPs are generated as well: proposed.
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authorized, and completed. The first two result from the
various conferences that Are convened to revise the SARP as
the overhaul approaches. The third documents the work that
was actually accomplished during the overhaul.
The bidding and contracting methods employed by the
Navy can have a substantial impact on the cost of ship
overhauls. For personnel reasons, it is very desirable for
a ship to be overhauled in a shipyard that is within close
proximity to its homeport. Unfortunately, this may tend to
drive overhaul costs higher than they might otherwise be.
Bids are not generally restricted to just one location, so
some ships are overhauled away from homeport- Under the
conventional maintenance policy the Navy historically has
used fixed price Master Ship Repair (MSR) contracts for
ship overhauls and repairs- The basic purpose of these
contracts is to establish the terms of the overhaul in
advance. Since conventional overhauls are planned a year or
more in advance, the scope of the actual work that will be
performed during the overhaul may not be known until after
the pricing is accomplished for the contract. In their
report on the AFSPMP contract vehicle, American Management
Systems, Inc. concluded that the
"...use of a fixed price MSR frequently leads to
optimistic pricing on the part of the competitors
in an effort to win the awards, with quality,
legal and administrative difficulties developing
when the true extent of the work is finally




MSC takes a somewhat dif-ferent approach to maintaining
its ships. The MSC maintenance policy is based on "prudent
risk", which implies that the policy is based on the idea
o-f using actual material condition as the primary
determinant o-f repair work. Repair work generally is not
authorized if there is no current evidence that it is
necessary.
The MSC maintenance policy is characterized by
relatively short and -frequent overhauls. Some o-f the
maintenance is dictated by Coast Guard and/or American
Bureau o-f Shipping (ABS) standards. MSC overhauls are
approximately one or two months in duration and are
scheduled every other year. In addition, a mid—period
inspection is usually per-farmed between the tenth and
-fourteenth month out o-f overhaul. During this two to three
week period, voyage repairs and ABS required inspections
are completed. Organizational level preventive and
corrective maintenance is per-formed throughout the
operating cycle as necessary.
MSC manned ships usually have a crew that is less than
one-half the size of its military counterpart. However, an
MSC crew tends to have a greater capability to perform
preventive and corrective maintenance because it has much
more experience than Navy crews. Chief engineers are a good
example. MSC chief engineers are better qualified than
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naval o-fficer chie-f engineers due to their extensive
experience and greater
-familiarity with their vessels. The
end result is that MSC crews can often make repairs for
which a Navy crew would require off-ship assistance.
Each MSC ship is assigned a land-based port engineer
who is charged with the responsibility of monitoring and
planning the repair work. Port engineers are experts in the
area of ship repair and are assigned to individual ships on
a continuing basis. This allows them to become extremely
knowledgeable about the machinery and equipment performance
history of the ships assigned to them. The end result is
that the port engineer is in an excellent position to
provide continuity to the long-run maintenance effort.
Maintenance planning under the MSC policy is much less
complicated than it is under the conventional one. Several
months before an overhaul is to start the port engineer
asks the chief engineer for work requests. The port
engineer then reviews the requests and may, at his option,
inspect some or all of the items referred to in the
requests. The port engineer then decides which of these
items will be included in the overhaul and supervises the
writing of the overhaul specifications. There are also a
variety of standard items that are routinely accomplished
during overhaul. Jobs requiring large dollar or manday
expenditures may require approval from the area engineering
officer, who is responsible for all of the port engineers
58

in his area. The port engineer may also prepare baseline
cost estimates and is involved in the contract preparation
and bidding process.
The bidding for MSC overhauls is not nearly as
geographically restricted as it is for active support ships
and combatants. This is primarily due to the fact that
there is no crew restraint. Bids are normally taken from
shipyards located on the coast where the ship is
homeported.
C. AFSPMP
The AFSPMP was implemented in 1981 for Atlantic Fleet
AFSs. The AFSPMP is tailored after, but is not identical
to, the MSC maintenance policy. The AFS Phased Maintenance
Program Second Formal Evaluation Report explicates six key
elements in the AFSPMP CRef. 16 : pp. 1-2,3 3. These
elements are summarized below.
1. Maintenance Cycle
The Atlantic Fleet AFSPMP five year operating cycle
is composed of four, two-or—three month long Selected
Restricted Availabilities (SRAs) , with approximately twelve
months between availabilities. One of the four SRAs in an
operating cycle is extended by one month to allow for
drydocking. No regular overhauls are scheduled.
2. Prudent Risk
The concepts of reliability centered maintenance
and on—condition assessment are utilized to determine what
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maintenance should be accomplished, thus eliminating most
preauthorized work items. Work is scheduled for an SRA or
assigned to a shipyard only when there is clear evidence of
actual or potential failure and the repairs are beyond the
capability of ship's force or Intermediate Maintenance
Activities (IMAs)
.
3. Wodern i 2 at i on
The relatively short but frequent SRAs require a
change in the way ship modernization is accomplished.
Marginally beneficial alterations are eliminated and the
remaining ones ^rs sectional i zed, when necessary, so that
they may be accomplished over a series of SRAs. This has
been called incremental modernization.
4. Port Engineers
Two port engineers Are assigned to the three
Atlantic Fleet AFSs. The port engineers work directly for
the Commander Surface Forces Atlantic Fleet (SURFLANT)
auxiliary type-desk officer, and they are responsible for
the planning, execution, and evaluation of all maintenance
performed on the AFSs CRef. 4: p. 5 3. They must also
accomplish machinery condition analysis, the specification
of job scope, and recommendations for assignment of work to
ship's force, IMA, or SRA.
5. Contract
The AFSPMP uses a cost-plus-award-fee, multi-year,
multi-ship contract with a sing'le private shipyard in the
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homeport. The AFSPMP contract is designed to be a one year
contract with four successive one year options that are
renewable by the Navy, for a total of five years of
overhaul work CRef. 15: p. 3 3.
The primary objectives of the contract are to: (1)
avoid the requirement to specify an inflexible work list
prior to an availability; (2) enable high quality and
timely work to be rewarded; (3) allow the crew to remain in
homeport during the availability; and (4) provide an
opportunity for learning in terms of improved efficiency
and familiarity for both the shipyard and ship's force.
6. Prepositioned Material
There are two types of prepositioned material. The
first type facilitates a change out (instead of a repair)
of equipment during an SRA. The purpose of the second type
is to make the spare parts and consumables for several
critical systems available to avoid preauthorizing
unnecessary work just to insure the presence of the
material if it is required during the availability.
D. COMPARISON OF MSC AND AFSPMP POLICIES
The AFSPMP was designed as a derivative of the MSC and
commercial maintenance policies. It was recognized that
differences in missions, crews, and armament systems would
not allow a simple copying of the MSC policy. Although the
basic mechanics of the two maintenance policies are the
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same, there are several major differences. The reader
should keep in mind that the terminology used by the two
organizations is not quite the same either. Although an SRA
technically is not an overhaul it takes as long to
accomplish as the MSC overhauls. In addition, the scope of
the repair and alteration work, as well as the manday and




Although AFSs still have a nominal five year
operating cycle, if one considers each SRA to be an
overhaul, then one can define an effective operating cycle.
The AFSPMP policy results in an effective operating cycle
that is approximately fifteen months long. The equivalent
operating cyle for MSC ships is approximately twenty-four
months in duration. Thus, the Navy has shortened the
effective operating cycle to about sixty percent of that
employed by MSC.
2. Port Engineers
Port engineers for the AFSPMP generally do not have
the absolute authority that MSC port engineers have. Their
role in the depot maintenance planning and execution
process is somewhat more limited than it would be in an MSC
environment. The port engineers are operating as closely as
possible to their MSC counterparts, with the major




This process is still more complex for the Navy
than it is for MSC. The Navy has had to adapt their
preauthorization approach to overhaul planning to the
on-condition assessment approach used by MSC. The Navy
still uses the same basic planning structure, but many of
the components have been revised to incorporate port
engineers and on-condition assessment.
4. Modernization
The Navy does a lot more modernization than
civilian or MSC type organizations. As previously indicated
in Table I, the Navy may expend as much as -four times the
resources on alterations. -I-f all of these alterations are
necessary, then there may be legitimate reasons for Navy
overhauls to cost more than MSC overhauls. The costs of
alterations are usually hard to separate from maintenance
costs. In addition, some alterations consist of replacing
outdated or inoperable equipment with new ones. Although
the cost of an alteration may include all of the equipment
and labor, it probably does not account for the repair
costs that would have been incurred had the equipment been
repaired instead of replaced.
E- SUMMARY
This chapter has briefly described the conventional,
MSC, and AFSPMP maintenance policies as they apply to the
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AFSs. The AFSs, under the conventional policy, were
scheduled -for overhauls of -four months duration and
overhaul intervals of fifty-four to sixty months. MSC
overhauls are approximately one or two months in duration
and are scheduled every other year. In addition, a
mid-period inspection is usually performed between the
tenth and fourteenth month out of overhaul. During this two
to three week period, voyage repairs and American Bureau of
Shipping required inspections are completed. The Atlantic
Fleet AFSPMP calls for a five year operating cycle composed
of four, two-or—three month long Selected Restricted
Availabilities (SRAs) , with approximately twelve months
between availabilities. One of the four SRAs is extended by
one month to allow for drydocking. In contrast to the
conventional policy, the MSC and AFSPMP policies are based
on prudent risk. Reliability centered maintenance concepts
are being employed in the AFSPMP. This chapter also
compared the MSC and AFSPMP policies since the AFSPMP
policy was modeled after the MSC policy. Differences in the
operating cycle, the port engineer concept, maintenance
planning, and modernization were addressed. The following
chapter will develop an evaluation of the AFSPMP.
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VI. AF5 PHASED MAINTENANCE PROGRAM EVftLUATION
The CNO authorized the AFS Phased Maintenance Program
(AFSPMP) in 1979 as a five year test ef-fort to (1) modify
the AFS overhaul cycle to minimize the duration of depot
level maintenance periods in order to facilitate keeping
one of three ships forward deployed at all times and (2)
test a maintenance plan similar to that employed by the
Military Seal if t Command <MSC) and commercial shipowners to
determine possible benefits to the Navy CRef. 4: p. 11.
The objective of this chapter is to evaluate the AFSPMP
with regard to the two goals stated above. The first
section of the chapter will concentrate on the total depot
and intermediate level maintenance costs for an Atlantic
Fleet AFS for a five year operating cycle under four
alternative maintenance policies. These will be used to
determine how well the AFSPMP has performed with regard to
costs. The second section of this chapter will present
several advantages and disadvantages of the AFSPMP in an
effort to analyze the benefits of the program. Finally, the
third section will attempt to determine how well the AFSPMP
has satisfied its original objectives.
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A. MANDAY AND DOLLAR MAINTENANCE COSTS
The intermediate and depot level maintenance costs for
an AFS under a series o-f alternative maintenance policies
can be used to determine how well the AFSPMP has performed
with regard to costs. Cost estimates are made for the
following alternative maintenance policies:
(1) FY 75-79 Conventional Maintenance Policy,
(2) FY 81-85 Conventional Maintenance Policy,
(3) FY 81-85 Phased Maintenance Policy, and
(4) FY 81-85 MSC Maintenance Policy.
There are two types of costs that are frequently used
to measure the cost of maintenance or repair work: mandays
and dollars. Costs are often measured in terms of mandays
instead of dollars so that inflation does not have to be
accounted for and due to differences in manday costs among
private and public shipyards, different locations,
etcetera. In this study both manday and dollar costs are
determined whenever possible.
The manday and dollar cost estimates for the first
policy are used as a baseline and represent the
conventional maintenance costs over a five year cycle prior
to phased maintenance. The second set of estimates are a
projection of the cost of conventional maintenance, as if
the AFSs had not entered phased maintenance. It assumes
there is a moderate amount of cost growth from one cycle to
the next. The estimates for the third policy are
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projections o-f the cycle manday and dollar costs of
maintaining an AFS under the AFSPMP. Finally, the estimate
•for the -fourth policy represents the dollar costs MSC would
incur, if an AFS Mas transferred to it. This is an
important estimate because the AFSPMP was modeled after the
MSC policy.
The cost elements considered are Regular Overhaul
(ROH) , Selected Restricted Availability (SRA) , Restricted
and Technical Availabilities (RA/TA) , Intermediate
Maintenance Activity (IMA), and Commercial Industrial
Service (CIS) . As mentioned in Chapter V, under phased
maintenance one of the four SRAs for each ship is extended
for drydocking. These SRAs will be referred to as DSRAs.
The primary sources of data for the first three
policies were the three program evaluations that were
produced by the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA 911) in
conjunction with American Management Systems, Inc. (AMS)
CRef. 16-18 3. These reports contain a large quantity of
actual manday and dollar cost data for the three Atlantic
Fleet AFSs. The data extracted for use in this study is
reproduced in Appendix B. The cost data used for the MSC
estimate were contained in a letter from the MSC
Engineering Officer to Information Spectrum, Inc. The
purpose was to provide cost information for use in a study
titled Final Report, Civilian Manning of AE, AFS, and AD
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Type Support Ships CRe-f. 19 3. The cover letter and
applicable enclosure Are also reproduced in Appendix B.
Two approaches were used to estimate the five year
cycle costs -for each o-f the -first three maintenance
policies. The first method for each policy was different
and resulted in point estimates only. Method one for the FY
75-79 conventional policy consisted of summing adjusted
historical cost data for the three Atlantic Fleet AFSs to
determine the average manday and dollar maintenance costs
for one AFS. The first method for the FY 81-85 conventional
policy consisted of extracting the manday cost estimate
made by AMS from the preliminary AFSPMP program evaluation
report that was published 30 September 1981 CRef. 17 D. The
method one estimates for the FY 81-85 AFSPMP were based on
those made by AMS and NAVSEA 911 in the second and third
formal AFSPMP program evaluation reports CRef. 16 and 181.
The IMA and CIS cost projections were made in March 1983
and the SRA/DSRA and RA/TA cost projections in August 1983.
Those projections were made approximately halfway through
the first AFSPMP five year operating cycle.
The second approach employed a somewhat more complex
cost model to aggregate the data. The model was used to
make estimates of the total cycle costs and to construct
confidence intervals. The first step was to use cost data
over several time periods for each AFS to compute the
average cost per time period, for each cost element, for
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each of the three AFSs. The corresponding costs for each of
the three AFSs were then averaged to determine the average
cost per time period, by cost element, to maintain one APS.
The average five year cycle cost for each cost element was
then projected by multiplying the average cost per time
period by the number of time periods during which that type
of cost would be incurred. The final step was to add the
individual cost elements together to estimate the average
total five year cycle cost for one APS. In the actual model
each cost element was considered to be a random variable
and the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) was used to assert that
the distribution of the mean of each of the random
variables is approximately normal. The means of these
distributions aire the average costs per time period to
maintain one APS. The variance for each of the new random
variables (representing the mean of the original cost
element random variables) is specified by the CLT to be the
sample variance of the three average cost per time period
values (one for each APS) divided by three. These random
variables were then summed in a two step process to form a
total cost random variable, which is also approximately
normally distributed. The distribution of the total cost
was then used to construct a confidence interval for the
total cost. The basic model used to aggregate the various
costs and determine the probability distribution of the
total cycle cost is developed in Appendix C.
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A simple cost aggregation scheme was used to estimate
the dollar costs for the MSC policy. Manday estimates and
confidence intervals were not possible for the MSC policy
due to data limitations. In addition, the cost element
structure of the MSC data is not exactly the same as the
structure for the other three policies. This problem is
explained in greater detail in Appendix E. It does not
present a significant problem for this analysis since a
rough MSC cost estimate is all that is required.
The source of data, assumptions, and methodology for
each of the cost estimates is presented in Appendix E.
Dollar costs were converted to constant FY 84 dollars using
the escalation factors in Appendix A. The point estimates
of the total cycle cost for each of the four alternative
maintenance policies are summarized in Table II.
The difference between the estimates produced by method
one and the cost model are small. Because of this and the
fact that the cost model resulted in an estimate of the
variance, all of the remaining discussion of costs for the
first three policies will be in reference to those produced
by the cost model. A summary of the individual cost
elements, based on the cost model for the first three
alternative policies, is provided in Table III.
The variances that resulted from the cost model were
used to determine ninety-five percent confidence intervals.




Atlantic Fleet AFS Five Year Operating Cycle Total Manday
and Dollar Depot and Intermediate Level Maintenance Costs






















FY 81-85 MSC none 23477.5
* AFSPMP dollar estimates are not in constant FY 84
dollars because the original data consisted o-f the sum
o-f the actual dollar expenditures. These estimates can
be assumed to be lower than they actually would be if
they could be converted to constant FY S4 dollars.
to the underlying assumptions of the cost model. Their
primary purpose is to gain insight into the differences in
the variability of the various alternative policies, not
the absolute variance. These point estimates and confidence
intervals are best displayed in bar chart form. Figures 2
and 3 present the manday and dollar cost point estimates
and the associated confidence limits.
The entries in Tables II and III and the bar graphs in
Figures 2 and 3 reveal many interesting things about the




Atlantic Fleet AFS Five Year Operating Cycle Manday
and Dollar Cost Element Estimates
MAINTENANCE POLICY MANDAYS FY 84 *000s */MANDAY
FY 75-79 CONVENTIONAL
ROH 46133.0 12219.8 264.9
RA/TA 14648.4 3708.0 253. 1
IMA/CIS 8569.8 1558.8 181.9
FY 81-85 CONVENTIONAL
ROH 69641.6 19232.4 276.2
RA/TA 14648.4 3708.0 253.1
IMA/CIS 8569.8 1558.8 181.9
FY 81-85 AFSPMP
SRA/DSRA 66419.4 26215.8 394.7
RA/TA 7734.0 1854.0 239.7
IMA 5368.0 950.0 177.0






Note: 1. AFSPMP policy costs are not in FY 84 dollars
as discussed in Table II.
2. The costs -for the first three policies are
based on the cost model
.
3. The choice o-f cost elements and basic
assumptions are detailed in Appendix E.
1. Total Cycle Cost
Table II and Figure 2 clearly show that the
projected AFSPMP cycle manday costs -For a single AFS are
smaller than the projected costs o-f conventional
maintenance had the phased maintenance program not been
implemented. In contrast to this, the projected AFSPMP
cycle dollar costs are greater than the corresponding
conventional maintenance costs. In addition, the dollar
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Figure 2 Manday Point Estimates and CIs
cost di-f-ference is probably understated in Table II and
Figure 3 due to the fact that the AFSPMP costs ar^ not in
FY 84 dollars. I-f the AFSPMP dollar costs could be
converted to FY 84 dollars they undoubtedly would be larger
than the numbers displayed.. On the other hand, it is
passible that the cost elements for the two policies are
not exactly the same. For example, NAVSEA has suggested
Telephone conversation with Mr. Kenneth Jacobs, of
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DOLLARS (FY 84 000s)
FY 75-79 COfW FY 31-85 COW FY 81-65 AFSPHP FY 81-85 IBC
Figure 3 Dollar Point Estimates and CIs
that the AFSPMP costs are more visible. In particular,
NAVSEA has indicated that some o-f the planning -for Fleet
Modernization Program (FMP) ship alterations (SHIPALTs)
that used to be performed by the Supervisor of
Shipbuilding, San Francisco, is now accomplished as part of
the SRA by the shipyard. As a result of these uncertainties
the cost estimates in this chapter should be viewed as
rough approximations. Some of the possible reasons for the
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incongruity in the manday and dollar costs are discussed in
the next paragraph.
2. Dollars per Manday
The final column of Table III was produced by
dividing each dollar estimate by the corresponding manday
estimate. The total cost per manday for the AFSPMP appears
to be significantly larger than for the conventional
maintenance policy. This is an important result because of
the extent to Mhich the Navy relies on manday costs for
decision making. If the dollar costs are not monotonical ly
related to the manday costs and one desires to stabilize or
reduce the dollar costs of maintenance as well as the
manday costs, then the two types of costs must be
considered simultaneously.
The difference in the cost per manday is due
entirely to the SRA and DSRA cost elements. Table III
indicates that the AFSPMP rate for this cost element is at
least $394.7 per manday and the conventional rate is *276.2
per manday. There are several passible reasons for such a
large difference.
One possible reason for this difference would be
that between the FY 75-79 and the FY 81-85 conventional
cycles the cost per manday increased more rapidly than
historical data would suggest. This would result in under
—
estimated FY 81-85 conventional policy dollar costs. In
1981 American Management Systems, Inc. estimated that in FY
75

84 the dollar per manday rate for private shipyards on the
East Coast would be 276 to 297 dollars per manday CRef. 17:
p. A-39 3. Those estimates are based on an exponential trend
line and the conventional policy rate in Table III is
within this range. In addition, the Ships Maintenance and
Modernization Division of the Office of the Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations for Logistics (OP-43) has indicated that
2
*276.2 per manday is not an unreasonable number.
A second possible reason is that the productivity
of the labor force used in the AFSPMP SRAs may be greater
than for conventional ROHs. The observation that dollar
costs can increase while mandays decrease is intuitive. One
way to reduce mandays and still get the job done is to hire
the most qualified personnel possible and give them good
tools and equipment to use. Mell trained and equipped
workers can accomplish much more work in a given number of
mandays than poorly trained and equipped personnel. The
managers of the AFSPMP have been very concerned with
keeping the number of mandays of depot level maintenance
below the CNO-imposed cap of 78000 mandays per ship per
cycle CRef. 16-18 3. Thus, in their attempts to minimize
mandays, the actual dollar costs may not have been
adequately considered. In terms of the formal optimization
problem in Chapter IV, the managers may not have properly
2"
Telephone conversation with Commander J.F. Hamma,
of OP-43, on 28 February 1984.
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weighted the dollar costs in their personal subjective
MOEs.
A third passible reason for such a large di-fference
between the two rates involves shipyard utilization. The
AFS SRAs are accomplished at the Jonathan Corporation
shipyard and are the primary source of revenue for that
shipyard. There has not been an AFS in the shipyard con-
tinuously. Therefore, overhead expenses may be greater on a
per ship basis. As more ships are put into phased mainte-
nance the shipyard will become more level-loaded , thereby
spreading the overhead costs among more availabilities and
ships. This would not have been a problem if the SRAs had
been accomplished at a large shipyard where there were many
other contracts as well. The extent to which this has
affected the AFSPMP dollar cost projections in this study
could not be determined due to lack of detailed cost data.
3. use Maintenance Projection
Another interesting result is the FY 81-85 MSC
maintenance policy cost estimate. The cost data used for
this estimate were extracted from a letter from the MSC
Engineering Officer to Information Spectrum, Inc. The
purpose was to provide cost information for use in a study
titled Final Report, Civilian Manning of AE, AFS, and AD
Type Support Ships, dated 5 April 1983 CRef. 191. The set
Telephone conversation with Commander J.F. Hamma,
of OP-43, on 28 February 1984.
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of cost data and the calculations made for this study are
contained in Appendix E.
Figure 3 shows that the AFSPMP dollar cost is
somewhat larger than the MSC cost. This is understandable
due to the fact that the Navy does not have extensive
experience with progressive maintenance policies and
because the AFSPMP and MSC policies are not identical.
The surprising result is that the MSC policy cost
estimate is nearly the same as the projected conventional
maintenance cost. This is significantly different from the
figures in Table I which indicate the Navy's cost used to
be three or four times as large as MSC.
The AFSPMP is modeled after the MSC policy. If
circumstances have changed such that MSC maintenance costs
are now of the same relative magnitude as the Navy
conventional policy, then perhaps the Navy should not move
toward the progressive MSC policy. This is certainly an
area in which more research must be done.
4. Cost Variance
The variances associated with the AFSPMP, as
indicated by the lower and upper confidence limits in
Figures 2 and 3, are clearly much smaller than for the
conventional policy. A small variance in costs is very
beneficial for planning maintenance and, since it is a
benefit, will be discussed in more detail in the next
section of this chapter.
78

5. Sensitivity o-F Total Cost to Cost Elements
Table III summarizes the cost element estimates for
each o-f the -four alternative maintenance policies. The FY
81-85 conventional and AFSPMP ROH/SRA cost elements account
•for seventy—five to eighty-eight percent of the total cycle
cost, whether the cost is measured in mandays or dollars.
This implies that variations in the cost of scheduled depot
level maintenance will influence the total cycle cost much
more than any of the remaining cost elements.
B. AFSPMP BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The primary quantitative and qualitative advantages and
disadvantages of the AFSPMP over the conventional
maintenance policy are presented below.
1 . Advantages
a. Manday Costs
Table II and Figure 2 clearly indicate that the
manday costs of maintaining an AFS under the AFSPMP are
approximately ten percent less than they would be under
conventional maintenance. This is beneficial because the
number of mandays of depot level maintenance available to
the Navy is finite.
b. Unscheduled Depot Maintenance
As one can see in Figures 4 and 5 the projected
AFSPMP unscheduled depot level maintenance is approximately
fifty percent of that projected for the conventional
79

H = SCHEDULED DEPOT LEVEL MAINTENANCE
= UNSCHEDULED DEPOT LEVEL MAINTENANCE








FY 75-79 COW FY 81-65 C«W FY81-fl5 AFSPNP
Figure 4 Manday Cost Element Distributions
policy. This implies that the AFSs, under phased
maintenance, have experienced -fewer casualties that require
depot level maintenance, indicating a general improvement
in material condition. The end result is that the AFSPMP
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Figure 5 Dollar Cost Element Distributions
c. Cost Variance
Figures 2 and 3 show that the AFSPMP and
conventional policy maintenance costs differ greatly in
variability. The confidence intervals for both the manday
and dollar costs are much larger for the conventional
maintenance policy. The source of the reduced variability
for the AFSPMP is probably a combination of two factors.
Bl

First, it is not unreasonable to expect that the costs of
shorter, more -frequent availabilities are inherently easier
to control than for the long in-frequent regular overhauls.
The second likely reason is the use o-f port engineers,
which will be discussed separately. Irrespective of the
reasons, the reduced variability implies that the AFSPMP
maintenance costs may be easier to budget and plan for than
would have been possible under the conventional maintenance
policy.
d. Availability
The AFS Phased Maintenance Program Third Formal
Evaluation Report CRef. 18: p. 3 3 was used as the source of
information concerning AFS downtime and availability.
The actual and projected downtime for the AFSs
is displayed in Figure 6. This figure shows that the AFSs
are spending much less time in Restricted Availabilities
and that the overall downtime thus far in the five year
cycle is about the same as it would have been under phased
maintenance.
Figure 7 compares the overall availability of
the AFSs under the two maintenance policies. Halfway
through the first AFSPMP cycle the availability is about
the same as it was under conventional maintenance. The
overall availability is projected to be seventy—two percent
for the AFSPMP as opposed to sixty-eight percent for
conventional maintenance. This modest four percent
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Figure 7 Atlantic Fleet AFS Availability
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improvement equates to approximately two and one-half
additional months that an AFS could be used operationally
during a sixty month cycle.
e. Mobility
f
One may argue that if the Navy must mobilize
its forces then the AFSPMP has a significant advantage over
conventional maintenance. This is because at any given
point in time the maximum time out of SRA for each of the
Atlantic Fleet AFSs would be twelve months or less. If the
AFSs were under conventional maintenance this maximum time
could be as large as forty-eight months. In addition, the
maximum time to make all three AFSs available would not
exceed four months, whereas a ship that had entered a
regular overhaul would probably require much more time. The
implication is that at any random point in time the AFSs
would, in general, be in a higher state of material
readiness under the phased maintenance program.
f. Schedule Stability
In recent years it has not been uncommon for
ships to remain in overhaul well past their scheduled end
dates. The effects of a ship coming out of overhaul several
months late can be dramatic. The schedule of the particular
ship obviously changes and in many cases the schedules of
other ships in the parent squadron or organization are also
affected. Even when ships complete their regular overhaul
on time it is not uncommon for them to have serious
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material problems throughout the -folloMing year. In
addition to solving those problems, intensive training must
be accomplished to return the ship to a high state o-f
readiness.
The point is that there is a significant amount
o-f uncertainty surrounding any regular overhaul. In the
past it has not been uncommon for one ship to take another
ship's operational commitments. Last minute changes in a
schedule are detrimental to morale and also can result in
an unfair sharing of deployments and other commitments.
Such was the case for the three Atlantic Fleet AFBs prior
to the implementation of the AFSPMP. Since the AFSs started
phased maintenance, all depot level availabilities have
been completed on time and all commitments have been met
CRef. 18: p. 51.
g. Material Condition
The Navy presently does not have a precise and
reliable way to quantitatively measure the material
condition of a ship. Many factors are involved and there is
no general agreement as to what the measure of
effectiveness should be. Two commonly used proxies for the
material conditon aire the number of C-Z and C—4 Casualty
Reports (CASREPs) per unit time and the number of
discrepancies reported by the Board of Inspection and
Survey (INSURV Board). The extent to which a maintenance
policy impacts upon these two measures is very difficult to
B5

determine because there are many other -factors that
significantly influence them. These include, but are not
limited to, the extent and nature of ship operations, the
training of equipment operators, the training of preventive
and corrective maintenance personnel and the extent to
which this maintenance is accomplished, and the attitude of
the ship's officers and senior enlisted personnel.
Only one INSURV has been completed since the
implementation of the AFSPMP and it was too soon after
implementation for the AFSPMP to have a substantial effect.
All three Atlantic Fleet AFSs are scheduled for INSURVs
during FY 84 and 85, so a detailed analysis will be
possible at about the same time the first five year cycle
comes to an end.
The AFSs averaged 3.0 C-3 and C-4 CASREPs per
quarter prior to the implementation of phased maintenance.
The occurrence of these for mission essential equipment
averaged 0.6 per quarter. Since implementation the average
number of C-3 and C-4 CASREPs has dropped to 2.1, but the
number of mission essential equipment CASREPs has increased
to 0.8 CRef. 18 : p. 111. The only conclusion that can be
reached from these statistics is that the material
condition of the AFSs has not been affected severely by the
AFSPMP.
There are, however, qualitative reasons to
believe that the material condition of the AFSs is slowly
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improving. Comments made by Commander Service Group Two and
the Commanding Officers of some of the AFSs lead to this
assertion CRef. 18: p. 14 3.
h. Training
Regular overhauls lasting six or more months
typically make it very difficult for the ship's crew to
remain in a high state of training readiness. The turnover
of personnel during an overhaul can be thirty percent or
higher. Dnce the ship completes the overhaul and becomes
operational again it takes a long time, perhaps six months
or more, to regain the level of training and operational
readiness that existed prior to the overhaul.
The AFSPMP has a strong advantage in this area.
The SRAs are only three or four months long; therefore, the
continuity in training is much easier to maintain,
i. Port Engineer Concept
The port engineer concept is a key element of
the AFSPMP and appears to be working well. The port
engineer helps to fill the void that exists between the
ship's crew and the various shore—based organizations. The
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA 911) reported in their
third formal evaluation that
"The ship, with the port engineer available as a
technical consultant, is able to make wiser
repair decisions. With the port engineer on site
as a TYCOM representative, the supervisor
(SUPSHIPS) is able to more efficiently monitor
the contractor and handle growth work. The
shipyard benefits from the port engineer's
commercial experience. The port engineer talks
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details with shipyard specification writers and
production foremen, providing an important
communications link that enhances 3RA
productivity. The port engineer often challenges
shipyard labor and material estimates.
Furthermore, the port engineer, as a direct TYCOM
representative, strives to adhere to CNO-imposed
manday constraints. He brings the TYCOM
maintenance staff right to the waterfront." CRef.
IB: pp. 10-11 :
2. Pi sadvantages
a. Dollar Costs
As previously discussed, the AFSPMP appears to
cost more dollars than the conventional policy. Table II
indicates that the additional expense may be twenty percent
or more. Although this figure may not be exact, it is a
very strong indication that the AFSPMP is not saving any
dollars. Further research must be conducted to determine if
the AFSPMP dollar costs can be reduced without changing the
benefits of the program. If the dollars costs cannot be
reduced, the CNO will have to determine if the AFSPMP
benefits are worth the additional dollar expense.
b. Flexibility
The frequent but short SRAs constrain the way
in which the AFSs can be used operationally. Each ship must
undergo a three month SRA following each twelve months of
operations. If for some reason the Navy is forced to
operate all three ships on an extended basis one or more of
the ships will miss an SRA- The effect of this on the
AFSPMP program is hard to determine. Due to the multi-ship
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multi-year contract structure the ef-fect would probably be
more dramatic under phased maintenance than it would be
under conventional maintenance, where single—ship contracts
are negotiated just prior to a specific overhaul. Short of
conducting a regular overhaul, it would be hard to recover
from a missed SRA. In addition, the maintenance cycle of
all of the AFSs would be thrown off schedule,
c. Modernization
The portions of ROMs and SRAs devoted to the
accomplishment of ship alterations (SHIPALTs) has led to a
backlog of SHIPALTs. This problem is compounded further
under phased maintenance because the number of mandays
available to perform alterations during a single SRA may be
fewer than the number of mandays required for a particular
SHIPALT. The backlog and an insufficient number of mandays
to complete all of the scheduled SHIPALTs led to a purge of
approximately thirty percent of the alterations scheduled
for the AFS Fleet Modernization Program (FMP) CRef. 16: p.
V-4 3. In addition, the short duration of SRAs led to the
accomplishment of SHIPALTs through "incremental
modernization." This means that the larger SHIPALTs are
broken down into smaller packages, which are accomplished
during successive SRAs. The method appears to be effective,
but certainly there are costs involved in redesigning the
SHIPALTs for accomplishment in small segments. As new
SHIPALTs are authorized this should not be a problem
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because they can be designed for incremental modernization
as necessary.
C. ACCOMPLISHMENT OF AFSPMP OBJECTIVES
Now that the primary advantages and disadvantages of
the AFSPMP have been discussed, it is passible to attempt
to determine if the AFSPMP has been successful in meeting
its goals.
1. Availability
The first goal was to minimize the duration of
depot level maintenance to facilitate keeping one ship in
the Mediterranean at all times. Prior to phased maintenance
the three Atlantic Fleet AFSs did not share deployments
equally. Although the projected availability of each AFS
under phased maintenance is four percent higher than under
conventional maintenance, the amount of time spent in depot
maintenance facilities is approximately the same. The
AFSPMP should, however, be considered to be a success with
respect to this first goal because the amount of
unscheduled depot level maintenance has decreased and the
three ships are able to meet their commitments and share
the workload evenly. This was summarized by the Naval Sea
Systems Command (NAVSEA 911):
"A primary reason for adopting the revised
schedule for Atlantic Fleet AFSs was to keep one
AFS on station in the Mediterranean with the
Sixth Fleet at all times. This is now being
accomplished without placing undue strain on any
Atlantic Fleet AFS. Phased maintenance has
brought stability and consistency to LANTFLT AFS
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deployment patterns. All SRAs have been completed
on—time or early. All operational commitments
have been met." CRe-f. 18: p. 5D
2. Test liSC-Type Maintenance Policy
The second goal was to test a policy similar to
that employed by MSC to determine the possible benefits to
the Navy. One should not expect the AFSPMP to be as
successful as MSC has been over the years because of the
relative inexperience of the Navy in progressive
maintenance policies and the differences between the two
policies. Some of these differences were discussed in
Chapter V.
The preceding sections of this chapter have
discussed some of the advantages the AFSPMP has over
conventional maintenance. One may conclude that the Navy
version of the MSC policy has exhibited attributes that are
very beneficial to the Navy. In terms of the MSC policy, at
this stage in the first AFSPMP five year cycle there is
really only one area that must be questioned—the dollar
costs.
Table II and Figure 3 show that the AFSPMP five
year cycle will cost approximately twenty—seven percent
more than MSC estimates it would have to spend. MSC did not
provide any indication of the variance in their estimates,
so it cannot be determined if the difference in the dollar
cost is statistically significant. In Appendix E the
variance of the MSC annual dollar cost was estimated
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through assumptions of normality and the accuracy o-f the
MSC cost data. It was -found that if the annual cost
estimate based on MSC data was accurate to within plus or
minus fifty percent then the ninety-five percent confidence
interval would be (20047.7 to 26907.3). Thus, even if MSC's
estimates are poor, their maintenance policy seems to be
less expensive than the AFSPMP.
One significant advantage the AFSPMP appears to
have over MSC is the cost of unplanned depot level
maintenance. Table III indicates that the MSC estimate of
unscheduled maintenance is at least five times as large as
the estimate for the AFSPMP.
3. Conclusion
There is no question that the AFS Phased
Maintenance Program (AFSPMP) has been successful in meeting
the objectives that were established at the outset of the
program. Since phased maintenance was implemented the
following have resulted: the projected AFS availability has
risen four percent; the Atlantic Fleet AFS deployment
problem no longer exists; the manday cost growth has been
stabilized; the material condition of the ships is
improving; the ships seem to be more reliable (as indicated
by a reduction in unscheduled depot level maintenance); the
dollar and manday costs are less variable; and training
continuity has been easier to maintain. In general, the
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AFSPMP appears to have substantially improved the general
Atlantic Fleet AFS situation.
The Navy is, however, paying dearly for these
benefits. As indicated in Table II the projected cost of
depot and intermediate level maintenance for one AFS for a
five year operating cycle is 83,035 mandays and at least
*29,870,000 (FY S4) . These costs reflect a reduction in tht
number of mandays and an increase in the number of dollars
as compared to the projected conventional maintenance
costs. The increase in dollar costs is at least twenty-two
percent or $5, 385, 000 (FY 84) per ship. This implies that
the AFSPMP is costing the Navy on the order of one million
additional dollars per year per ship. Since the Navy
generally does not have enough money to fund all of the
programs desired, one must ask the question: Is the phased
maintenance program a cost-effective alternative to the
conventional maintenance policy for AFSs and for other




VII. PHASED MAINTENANCE—A COST-EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE
TO CONVENTIONAL MAINTENANCE?
Chapter VI concluded that the AFS Phased Maintenance
Program (AFSPMP) has met the objectives that were
established for it at the outset of the program. It also
identified some of the benefits of the AFSPMP and
established that the dollar costs of maintaining an AFS
under phased maintenance are estimated to be twenty percent
more than under the conventional policy.
The purpose of this chapter is to address the larger
question: Is the phased maintenance program a cost-
effective alternative to the conventional maintenance
policy? The mathematical formulation of the Navy overhaul
problem presented in Chapter IV will be used in discussing
this question. The first section of this chapter will
discuss the cost-effectiveness of the AFSPMP as it applies
to the Atlantic Fleet AFSs- The expansion of the phased
maintenance program will be addressed in the second
section.
A. ATLANTIC FLEET AFSs
Although it is impassible to establish the optimal ity
of the AFSPMP it is possible to evaluate it against the
conventional policy. The purpose of doing this is to
determine if the Navy is better off with phased maintenance
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than it would have been under the old policy. Two policies,
therefore, must be compared: the FY Bl-85 conventional
policy and the FY 81-85 phased maintenance policy.
The real question as to which solution is "better"
rests in the value o-f the MOE -for each o-f the two policies.
In fact, this is how Navy decision makers deal with these
types of problems. They have subjective MOEs that are used
to evaluate the various trade-offs that characterize the
available alternatives. If the MDE is properly defined it
will account for all of the passible trade-offs. For
example, the marginal utility of having a specified number
of additional units of reliability would be worth a certain
additional number of dollars.
A simple approach to illustrate how the AFSPMP can be
compared to the conventional policy is to use a linear MOE
based on deviations from the goals set by the decision
makers (DMs) . Many analytical models in resource allocation
in hierarchical multi—level planning systems employ this
type of objective function CRef. 20 3.
The constraints in Chapter IV can be viewed as the
goals in this problem. If the goals are established at the
ship level then the primary goals in the formulation are
Bo = BT/3, Do = DT/3, lo = IT/3, CMOo, CMBo, AVo, CAo, TRo,
SCHo, Ro, FMPo, and LVo. These variables were defined in
Chapter IV on page 34.
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Let Yk(+) be a vector representing the amount the kth
element exceeds the established goal and Yk (— ) be the
amount the kth element -falls short o-f its goal. Then, i-f
Wk(+) is a vector representing the decision makers' Heights
for the Yk(+) deviations and Wk(-) the weights for the
Yk(— ) deviations, the objective function of the formal
optimization problem can be rewritten as:
Minimize MOE = Wk(+)*Yk(+) + Wk(-)*Yk(-).
Assumptions about the goal levels and weights must be
made in order to continue this illustration. Suppose the
DMs have set the goals indicated in Table IV. These goals
were derived from the fallowing information. Quantitative
information concerning Bo, Do, lo, and AVo was presented in
Chapter VI. The cost model estimates are used in this
analysis. The dollar goal Bo is assumed to be the dollar
cost of depot and intermediate maintenance for an AFS for
the FY 75-79 conventional maintenance policy. The goal for
the total depot level manday budget Do and the intermediate
level manday budget lo are also for that policy. The
availability was 68 percent under conventional maintenance
and is projected to be 72 percent under the AFSPMP CRef.
18: p. 3D. Assume that 70 percent, the average of the two,
is the AVo goal. The discussion of the benefits of the
AFSPMP in Chapter VI revealed that the reliability of each
AFS appears to have improved as well as the overall
training. The reliability Ro and training TRo goals in
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Table IV are assumed to be 90 percent. The R and TR values
for the two policies are based on the assumption that the
AFSPMP has met the goal and that it was a 10 percent
increase over the conventional policy. None o-f the other
constraints are included because data -for those variables
Mere either limited or not available. Casualty Report
(CASREP) information was not included because the results
presented in Chapter VI were not conclusive.
TABLE IV
Example AFSPMP and Conventional Maintenance Policy
Goal Deviations
FY 81-85 FY 81-85 CONV AFSPMP
ITEM GOAL CONV AFSPMP Yk(+/-) Yk(+/-)
Bo 17486.6 24499.2 29869.8 7012. 6(-) 12383. 2 (-)
Do 60781.4 84290.0 74153.4 23508. 6(-) 13372. O(-)
lo 8569.8 8569.8 8882.0 312. 2(-)
AVo 70 68 72 2 (-) 2 ( + )
Ro 90 80 90 10 (-)
TRo 90 80 90 10 (-)
The values in Table IV can now be plugged into the MOE
for each o-f the policies under comparison. Letting MOEc be
the MOE for the FY 81-85 conventional policy and MOEa be
the MOE for the FY 81-85 AFSPMP, the equations are:
MOEc = 7012. 6*W1 (-) +23508. 6*W2(-)+2*W4(-)+10*W5(-)+10*W6(-)
and MOEa = 12383. 2*W1(-) + 13372»W2 (-) +312. 2*W3(-) +2*W4 (+)
.
The next thing that must be accomplished is the
determination of weights, which specify the decision
makers' preferences and trade-offs. The weights must
contain a factor representing the overall importance of the
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particular attribute as well as a scaling factor to account
for the differences in activity levels.
The last three weights are all based on the same scale
so they will be resolved first. Assume that the DMs have
decided that failure to achieve the goal for availability
and reliability are equally important, thus establishing
that W4(— ) = W5(-). Furthermore, assume that the reward for
achieving an excess of availability is weighted one-half of
the penalty for failing to achieve the goal. This implies
that W4(+) = -W4(-)/2. Also assume that training is
considered only one—half as important as availability,
resulting in W6(-) = W4(-)/2. This is not unreasonable
because a trained -crew cannot complete a mission if their
ship cannot get underway. Likewise, if the crew is not
properly trained to use the ship it will not be very
effective even though the ship can get underway.
Assume the DMs believe that mandays of depot level work
are one-half as important as dollar costs, since they feel
the pressure of dollar constraints more than manday
constraints. A correction must be made for the difference
in levels; the manday goal is 3.5 times as large as the
dollar goal. The resulting relationship between the weights
is then Wl (-) =2*3. 5*W2 (-) . Also assume that intermediate
level mandays aire only one—half as important as total
dollar costs. Since the dollar goal is two times larger
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than the intermediate maintenance manday goal the
relationship is Wl (-) = W3(-).
Similar terms in the two MDE equations can now be
combined, resulting in:
MOEc = 10371. 0*W1 (-) + 17 W4(-> and
MOEa = 14605. 7*W1 (-) - 1 * W4(-).
Since the objective function is a minimization, the AFSPMP
will be evaluated as being better than conventional
maintenance if MOEa < MOEc, or MOEa - MOEc < O. This
condition can be used to determine the critical point for
the relationship between the availability and dollar
weights. If
MOEa - MOEc = 4234.7*W1(-) - 18»W4(-) < O, then
Wl(-)/W4(-) < 18/4234.7 = .00425 implies that the
AFSPMP is better than conventional maintenance. So, if the
DMs assign dollar and availability weights such that the
ratio is less than .00425, the AFSPMP will have a smaller
MOE value than the conventional policy and hence will be
closer to the optimal solution.
One way to evaluate the ratio above is to consider the
total depot and intermediate level dollar cost of an AFS
over a five year operating cycle. The total dollar cost for
the FY S1-B5 conventional policy was estimated to be
^24499. 2 (FY 84 000s). Since there are 100 percentage
points of availability during a five year cycle the dollar
cost is *245.0 per percentage point. This can be used to
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correct -for the di-fference in activity levels. I-f one then
assumes that availability and dollar costs are of equal
importance the result is:
Wl(-) = W4(-)/245.0 or Wl(-)/W4(-) = .0041.
Although this ratio is only slightly smaller than .00425 it
implies that given the weighting assumptions in the
preceding paragraphs the AFSPMP is better than the
conventional maintenance policy. This outcome is somewhat
sensitive to each of the assumed weights but the
relationship between the availability and cost weights is
the driving -factor.
Notice that only the depot and intermediate level costs
were considered in the final scaling of weights. If one
were to include the prorated cost of procurement and
ownership of an AFS for a five year operating cycle the
ratio would be much smaller. For example, assume that an
AFS cost *300000 (FY 84 000s) to procure and that it has a
lifespan of thirty years. The resulting prorated cost for a
five year cycle is *50000 (FY 84 000s). Information
Spectrum, Inc. estimated the annual total operations and
maintenance economic cost to the Department of Defense for
one AFS to be ^14670 (FY 82 000s) CRef. 19: p. 66 3. The
economic cost in FY 84 dollars is *15853 (FY 84 000s)
annually or *79265 (FY 84 000s) over a five year operating
cycle. The total cost of procurement and ownership over a
five year operating cycle is then estimated to be $129265
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(FY 84 000s). Making the same assumptions as above,
Wl(-)/W4(-) = .0008, which is much smaller than the
critical value.
Working back the other way one can determine the
relative level o-f importance that must be assigned, based
on the total costs, to conclude that the AFSPMP is better
than conventional maintenance. If X is the multiplier
representing the importance of dollars over availability
and a scaling factor of 129265/100 = 1292.6 is introduced
to account for different activity levels, then Wl (— ) =
X*W4(-)/1292.6. Now,
Wl(-)/W4(-) = X/1292.6 = .00425 => X = 5.5.
Therefore, if the DMs weight the dollar cost of maintenance
more than 5.5 times as important as ship availability, they
will reach the conclusion that the conventional policy is
better. In contrast to this, if the weight is less than 5.5
the conclusion will be that the AFSPMP is better than
conventional maintenance. Finally, if the weight is exactly
5-5 the DMs will be indifferent to the two policies.
The general conclusion that can be reached from this
simple linear MOE model is that there is good reason to
believe that the AFSPMP is better than the conventional
maintenance policy despite the fact that the dollar costs
are estimated to be approximately twenty percent higher.
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The next section o-f this chapter addresses the expansion o-f
the phased maintenance program.
B. OTHER CLASSES OF SHIPS
Although the AFSPMP appears to be a good alternative to
the conventional maintenance policy, much caution should be
observed in applying it to other classes o-f ships.
1. Auxiliary and Amphibious Ships
The phased maintenance program is in the process o-f
being expanded to include several classes o-f auxiliary and
amphibious ships. Table V shows the implementation -fiscal
year for each o-f the classes involved. The classes o-f ships
TABLE V
Phased Maintenance Program Expansion










Note : Atlantic/Pacific Fleet implementation
dates are indicated where di-fferent.
CRe-f. 211
in Table V include more than eighty ships in the active
Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, indicating how extensive the
phased maintenance program will be in just a few years. The
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decision to expand the phased maintenance program was based
largely on the early results of the AFSPMP. The third
-formal program evaluation stated,
"The potential for exportation of the phased
maintenance concept continues to be great.
However, as pointed out in the previous report,
strict adherence to the proven model is
essential. Deviations must be carefully
assessed." CRef. 18: p. 25
D
Decisions concerning the expansion of the phased
maintenance program should account for several important
possible problems.
a. AFSPMP Test
One of the primary objectives of the AFSPMP was
to test a maintenance policy similar to that employed by
MSC. The phased maintenance program for Atlantic Fleet AFSs
has essentially been an experiment and this fact must be
kept in mind in evaluating the results. The variance of the
cost estimates and other statistics must be considered very
carefully. In addition, as discussed in Chapter IV,
experiments tend to be artificial and the results may be
biased due to the fact that people involved in experiments
do not necessarily conduct themselves as they would in a
nan—test environment.
b. Ship Differences
There is no guarantee that what works for one
class of ships will work for another. In terms of the
problem formulation in Chapter IV, the constraints of the
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optimization problem cauld be much different for the
various classes o-f ships. The engineering and operational
characteristics of the ship classes identified in Table V
are generally not the same as those of the AFSs. Some of
these differences are briefly discussed beloN.
The AFSs have three bailers as apposed to the
two that characterize most auxiliary and amphibious ships.
The missions of the various classes of ships are also
dissimilar, resulting in differences in their basic
construction: the AFSs have large storerooms for cargo; the
AORs, AOEs, and AOs have large tanks for carrying fuel; the
LSDs and LPDs have large floodable well decks; and the LPHs
are helicopter carriers with full flight decks. There are
also considerable differences in the communications and
weapons systems installed in the various classes of ships.
The operational uses of these ships also vary
significantly and the deployment patterns are not all the
same. In fact, the deployment patterns of ships of the same
class may be different, depending on whether they are in
the Atlantic or Pacific Fleet. The AFSs, like many of the
auxiliary and amphibious ships, are usually scheduled for
standard six month long deployments. This is not true for
the auxiliary ships that are assigned to specific carrier
battle groups. Their deployments usually last longer and




The number o-f people per ship managing the
phased maintenance program is likely to decrease as more
ships are added to the program. This means that management
of the system may become more difficult with the possible
result of reducing the effectiveness of the program. What
works on a small scale does not always work on a large
scale. Monitoring the effectiveness of the phased
maintenance program will also be much harder to accomplish
due to the sheer volume of information that must be
processed.
2. Frigates, Destroyers, and Cruisers
Expansion of the phased maintenance program to
include frigates, destroyers, and cruisers has also been
considered. These ships are so much different from the
auxiliary and amphibious ships that additional thought must
be given to any change in their maintenance policy.
These ships have large weapons suites, making them
considerably more electronic intensive than the auxiliary
and amphibious ships. The efficacy of the phased
maintenance program in adequately dealing with sonars, gun
and missile systems, etcetera has yet to be proven. In
addition, the configuration of the engineering plants is
quite variable. Some of the ships have two boilers and one
shaft, others have four boilers and two shafts, and then
there are the gas turbine frigates and destroyers.
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The Navy has had some experience in progressive
maintenance policies with the FFG-7 class of -Frigates.
However, these ships were designed with this type o-f
maintenance in mind, so the results may not easily be
applied to the situation at hand. The Navy has implemented
phased maintenance for the Naval Reserve FF-1052s and after
one SRA the program appears to be working smoothly. This
program should be very useful in helping to determine if
phased maintenance is a good alternative to the
conventional policy for other frigates, destroyers, and
cruisers. In addition, the auxiliary ships under phased
maintenance that are tied to battle groups may provide
useful information regarding the compatibility of phased




VIII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The primary objective of this thesis has been to
determine if the AFS Phased Maintenance Program (AFSPMP)
has been successful in meeting its goals and if it is a
cost-effective alternative to the conventional maintenance
policy for the Atlantic Fleet AFSs. A secondary objective
was to examine several aspects of the expansion of the
phased maintenance program.
The evolution of the thorough overhaul concept, which
forms the basis for the conventional maintenance policy,
was described in Chapter II. This policy resulted from the
desire of senior military personnel to improve the material
condition of the fleet. The end result was that overhaul
repair work was determined largely on the basis of risk
avoidance and preauthorization. Risk avoidance is
characterized by the inclusion of "insurance items" in the
overhaul package. These are items for which there is no
current indication that repair work will be needed, but for
which it is believed repair work is needed to ensure the
ship will be able to operate reliably during its
operational cycle. Preauthorization of repair work
resulted primarily from the long planning process that is
inherent in the conventional policy.
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Chapter III reviewed several pertinent studies that
strongly indicate the Navy may be able to find a
maintenance policy better than the conventional one. Those
studies concluded that, in general, the Military Seali-ft
Command (MSC) is able to maintain comparable ships at a
significantly lower cost than the Navy can. One General
Accounting Office (GAD) report recommended that the Navy
move away from insurance repairs toward the concept of
reliability centered maintenance (RCM) . The basic principle
of RCM is to perform only those maintenance tasks that are
necessary to maintain designed levels of safety and
rel iabi 1 i ty.
Chapter IV briefly examined the problem of finding an
optimal strategy for maintaining ships in a high state of
readiness without incurring unreasonable costs. A very
general formulation of the optimization problem was
presented to aid in the discussion of the complexity of the
problem. The problems involved in determining an adequate
measure of effectiveness and the mathematical intervariable
relationships were also addressed. Chapter IV also reviewed
several approaches that have been used to investigate
simplified versions of the general overhaul problem. The
conclusion reached was that the Navy currently has only one
method to reliably evaluate alternative maintenance
policies—implement a trial maintenance policy and analyze
the results. The Navy authorized such a trial maintenance
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policy for AFSs in 1979 and called it the AFS Phased
Maintenance Program (AFSPMP)
.
Chapter V briefly described the conventional, MSC, and
AFSPMP maintenance policies as they apply to the AFSs. The
AFSs, under the conventional policy, were scheduled for
overhauls of four months duration and overhaul intervals of
fifty-four to sixty months. MSC overhauls are approximately
one or two months in duration and are scheduled every other
year. In addition, a mid-period inspection is usually
performed between the tenth and fourteenth month out of
overhaul. During this two to three week period voyage
repairs and inspections required by the American Bureau of
Shipping are completed. The Atlantic Fleet AFSPMP calls for
a five year operating cycle composed of four, two—or—three
month long Selected Restricted Availabilities (SRAs) , with
approximately twelve months between availabilities. One of
the four SRAs is extended by one month to allow for
drydocking. In contrast to the conventional policy, the MSC
and AFSPMP policies Are based on prudent risk. Reliability
centered maintenance concepts are being employed in the
AFSPMP. Chapter V also compared the MSC and AFSPMP
policies, since the AFSPMP policy was modeled after the MSC
policy. Differences in the operating cycle, the port




The costs o-f maintaining an average Atlantic Fleet AFS
over a five year operating cycle were estimated for each of
four alternative maintenance policies: (1) FY 75-79
conventional policy; (2) FY 81—85 conventional policy; (3)
FY 81-85 AFSPMP policy; and (4) FY 81-85 MSC policy. Both
manday and dollar costs were estimated whenever passible.
These costs were used in Chapter VI as part of an
evaluation of the AFSPMP. The cost estimates revealed that,
although the manday cost of depot and intermediate level
maintenance has decreased by ten percent with the
implementation of phased maintenance, the dollar cost has
risen approximately twenty percent. In addition, the dollar
estimate for the MSC policy is nearly the same as the
projected conventional maintenance costs. This was
surprising since for many years MSC's costs were reported
to be one—third to one—fourth those of the Navy. In
addition, the Navy appears to have reduced the cost of
unscheduled depot level maintenance by fifty percent
through phased maintenance. Another interesting result was
that the estimated variance of the AFSPMP costs was much
smaller than for the conventional policy. The reduced
variability implies that the AFSPMP maintenance costs may
be easier to budget and plan for than would have been
possible under the conventional maintenance policy.
Some of the observed advantages and disadvantages of
the AFSPMP were also presented. The most important
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advantage concerns the availability of the AFSs for fleet
operations. The AFS availability is estimated to be four
percent greater under phased maintenance than it was during
the last conventional maintenance policy five year cycle.
In addition, the AFSs have been able to meet all of their
commitments with an equal sharing of deployments. The
material condition of the ships, training, and the port
engineer concept were also discussed. The program
evaluation in Chapter VI resulted in the conclusion that
the AFSPMP has met the goals that were established for it
at the inception of the program. In essence, the goals of
the program were to stabilize Atlantic Fleet AFS deployment
patterns through a reduction in depot level maintenance and
to test a maintenance policy similar to that employed by
MSC to see what benefits there might be for the Navy.
Finally, Chapter VII addressed the question of whether
phased maintenance is better than conventional maintenance.
This was done in two steps: (1) as applied to the Atlantic
Fleet AFSs and (2) as applied to other classes of ships. To
evaluate the cost—effectiveness of the AFSPMP, a simple
objective function was developed for the optimization
problem in Chapter IV. The objective function is linear and
is based on deviations from preset goals. Based on several
reasonable assumptions, it was determined that the AFSPMP
is a cost-effective alternative to the conventional policy.
This result was driven primarily by the supposition that
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•four percent additional availability is worth the
additional AFSPMP dollar costs. The expansion o-f the phased
maintenance program to other ships was discussed as it
applies to auxiliary and amphibious ships, -frigates,
destroyers, and cruisers. The limitations of the AFSPMP
test were also addressed, as well as system management
considerations and the physical and operational differences
among classes of ships.
B. CONCLUSIONS
Several important conclusions were reached during the
execution of this study.
First and foremost, it was concluded that there
presently is no closed form solution to the problem of
determining optimal maintenance policies for Navy ships.
Therefore, in order to evaluate alternative maintenance
policies the Navy must implement these policies and analyze
the results. In effect, the Navy is attempting to find the
optimal maintenance policy through an iterative process.
The next major conclusion was that the manday costs of
maintaining a ship under phased maintenance are
approximately ten percent less than under conventional
maintenance, while the dollar costs have risen twenty
percent. In addition, the costs of unplanned depot level
maintenance experienced in the AFSPMP are one—half what
they were prior to phased maintenance, indicating that the
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reliability of the AFSs may be improving. At the same time,
the AFSPMP has resulted in a stabilization of deployment
patterns and a four percent increase in overall
avai labi 1 ity.
It was also concluded that the Military Seal if t Command
(MSC) and Navy conventional maintenance costs are
approximately the same. This implies that either the Navy
has been able to reduce its costs relative to MSC, or MSC's
costs have risen significantly. The former explanation
seems unlikely.
The AFSPMP Mas evaluated against the objectives that
Mere established for it at its inception and it Mas
concluded that the AFSPMP has met those objectives. The
availability problems appear to have been solved and many
of the potential benefits of a progressive maintenance
policy have been identified.
To ansMer the larger question of Mhether phased
maintenance is better than conventional maintenance it was
necessary to develop a simple model. A simple linear
objective function for the optimization problem in Chapter
IV Mas created to illustrate how the AFSPMP could be
compared against the conventional policy. Based on several
reasonable assumptions, the analysis indicated that the
AFSPMP has been a better policy for the Atlantic Fleet AFSs
than the conventional policy Mould have been.
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Finally, it was concluded that due to the limitations
of the AFSPMP test bed, the potential system management
problems, and the di-f -ferences in classes o-f ships, the
expansion o-f the phased maintenance program should be
conducted in a cautious manner and monitored very closely.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The -first recommendation is that the Navy should
conduct more research in an attempt to solve the Navy
overhaul problem. Once a valid measure of effectiveness and
set of functional relationships are discovered, the Navy
may be able to substantially reduce its maintenance costs
without reducing the operational readiness of its ships.
The Navy should also conduct a thorough comparison of
the MSC and Navy maintenance costs- Indeed, if MSC can no
longer maintain ships for less dollars than the Navy, then
perhaps the Navy should not be implementing an MSC-type
maintenance policy.
Although the AFSPMP appears to be a cost-effective
alternative to conventional maintenance, the dollar costs
of the program should be monitored very closely to
determine exactly how much more phased maintenance costs.
In addition, it is recommended that close observation of
the phased maintenance program be continued as it is
implemented for more classes of ships. The differences
between other classes of ships and the AFSs may result in
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' less than acceptable results. The more closely the cost*
and bene-fits are monitored, the sooner problems will be






The composite escalation -factors below were obtained
•from two sources. The FY 74-80 factors were obtained from
the Systems Analysis Division (Support for Manpower and
Logistics) of the Navy Program Planning Office (OP-914)
.
Those indices are the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) Indices - Constant FY 84 Budget Dollars, dated 10
February 1983. The FY 81-88 indices were extracted from the
Pricing and Cost Escalation Guidance for FY 85 Program
Objective Memorandum (POM-85) . Those indices were published
in the Office of The Chief Of Naval Operations letter POM
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This appendix contains seven tables of data and one
letter that are used in Appendixes D and E -for determining
conversion factors and estimating costs. The purpose for
providing the raw data is to enable the reader to trace the
calculations from start to finish. The source of the data
for each table is identified following each table.
TABLE B-1
Mandays and Dollars Expended for AFS Regular Overhauls
MflVSEA . TYCON TflTAL TOTAL
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Btttl AAA Nichint 7/24/74 - 3/24/73 3,874 24,326 28,200 4 ,710
USS SAN JOSE










Enginttr 2/9/77 - 11/3/77 10,336 46,739 37,075 10 724
USS CONCORD




Enginttr 4/1/7? - 12/19/79 8,923 42,049 50,974 12, 673
USS SAN JOSE
(AF8-7I SOS San Francltco &/12/S0 - 12/9/BO 8,302 43,899 52,701 18, 506
• Ettiaattd NAV8EA and TYCOH aandayt battd on knoNn NAVSEA and TYCOH cottt and total aandayt.
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NO - No D«ti Availabli
• - Beciutt of ixttntivt repairs ncctstary prior to beginning PHP, thii data point
was treattd at an anoaaly and not used in davelopient of Table A-3.
CRef. 17: A-IOD
TABLE B-3
Mandays Expended by SIMA and IMAs - Prior to AFSPMP
QUARTER USS SYLVANIA (AFS-2) USS CONCORD (AFS-5) USS SAN 0IE8O (AFS-6)
AFTER ROH QTR/YR NANDAYS QTR/YR NANDAYS QTR/YR NANDAYS
1 1/76 470 1/79 571 4/74 209
2 2/74 298 2/79 619 1/75 342
3 3/76 404 3/79 432 2/75 164
4 4/76 395 4/79 219 3/75 635
S 1/77 374 1/80 163 4/73 234
6 2/77 8S3 1/74 No Data 1/76 264
7 3/77 133 2/74 No Data 2/76 829
B 4/77 475 3/74 No Data 3/76 714
? 1/78 52B 4/74 438 4/76 210
to 2/78 367 1/73 144 1/77 247
11 3/78 481 2/75 223 2/77 291
12 4/78 708 3/73 177 3/77 931
13 1/79 370 4/73 373 4/77 223
14 2/79 46B 1/76 399 1/78 322
IS 3/79 340 2/76 480 2/78 1123
16 4/79 763 3/76 307 3/78 938
17 1/80 197 4/76 562 4/78 489
IB 2/80 736 1/77 484 1/79 202
1? 3/80 404 2/77 578 2/79 306
20 4/80 RSO 1 3/77 774 3/79 364




Mandays Expended on CIS - Prior to AFSPMP
USS SYLVANIA (flF3-2) USS CONCORD (AF3-3) USS SAN DIESO (AFS-6)
OTR/YR COST HANDAYS COST HANOAYS COST tlANDAYS
4/78 . . 6,500 38 38,797 227
1/79 - - 19,903 114 22,206 127
2/79 20,900 116 2,199 12 26,263 146
3/79 890 S - - 348 2
4/79 43,090 229 — / - RSO I
13,132 68 73,423 391
2/80 - - SRA II
3/80 89,218 442
4/80 RSO I
CRef. 17: p. A-173
TABLE B-5




QTR/YR « COST HANDAYS
USS CONCORD (AFS-5) USS SAN D1E80 (AF3-6)
BTR/YR » COST HANDAYS OTR/YR COST MANDAYS
1/BI
2/81
184,032 868 3/80 80,838 400 1/80 20,449 106
4/80 48,729 233 2/80 41,374 210
1/81 - - 3/80 - -
2/81 41,303 190 4/80 - -
1/81 73,439 336
2/81 38,636 178




AFSPMP Actual and Projected Manday and Dollar

















































































































TOTAL 101,118 138,400 120,247 »43,34S 221,345 »83,74S
CRef. 18: pp. 8-9 3
TABLE B-7






SIHA/IMA CIS TOTAL TOTAL
USS SYLVANIA (AFS-2) 748 820 1,368
USS CONCORD (AFS-S) 1,186 439 1,624
USS SAN DIEBO (AFS-6) 1,357 866 2,423
4,336 2,771 7,327 8,893
4,288 2,608 6,896 8,320
3,732 2,182 3,934 8,357
TOTAL 3,491 2,124 3,613 12,396 7,361 20,137 23,772
CRe-f. 16: p. III-IOD
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.'^'•- DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
••,•,
— ' a:- COMMANDER MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND^
-
. «•: Bcrcn TO-
i.\ JSr^ .• i^' WASHINGTON O C 2039O M-4EX
"^•uCs^^ - 4700
MAY 1 7 iStu
Information Spectrum, Inc.
1745 Jefferson Davis Highway
Arlington, Virginia 22202
Attention: Mr. Richard Osseck
Gentlemen:
The information requested during your meeting with Mr. -Robert Jacobs on April
26, 1982 is forwarded for your consideration. Data covering the AFS-1 and
AO-37 was developed primarily from studies performed in late 1976. The AE-25
data is based upon the same study, plus the cost and experience gained during
the recently completed yard modification to civilian manning on the USNS
KILAUEA (T-AE-26).
Because these data were generated primarily from the 1976 study and without the
benefit of shipcheck, a caution must be noted. A high confidence level is
placed upon the data if the assumed conditions were, in fact, the actual
conditions existing on board the ships. It is emphasized that MSC has not
visited the ships in question and has assumed a "typical" material condition
and arrangement problems reflected by recent civilian manning of fleet ships
experience.
Further, the 1976 study concluded that civilian manning of the AD-37 was
impracticable due to crew size and limited space. The cost of making the
space available also contributed to the impracticable assessment. (The
validity of that evaluation is upheld by the current reassessment of the
AD-37 CIVMOD.)
The data provided is considered of "study quality", however, if refined
budget estimates are required, MSC will have to visit the ships and perform
in-depth study of material conditions and solutions to CIVMOD problems.





1. Material conditions good to excellent as found on the KILAUEA
2. Material upgrade of UNREP equipment costs are not part of the study, but
costs to be incurred under either operational scenario.
3. The additional 3,000 sq. ft. of space in the deck house can be added
without extraordinary measures.
Manning Scale Increase
Due to the size of the proposed crew quarters and support of an additional
10 people, an increased deck house must be provided. An estimated 3,000 sq. ft.
(gross) addition to the deck house over and above the KILAUEA modifications.
One-Time Costs
$4,500,000 - Repair, overhaul, drydock, regulatory inspection and
maintenance
$19,750,000 - Habitability modifications, support systems, and other
changes required for civilian manning (includes estimated
$1,000,000 addition to support increase manning).
Recurring Costs
Fuel Consumption data is presented rather than costs so that the exact
scenario may be calculated.
374 BBLS/Day Underway
291 BBLS/Day Underway Replenishing
90 BBLS/Day In Port
Maintenance/Repair costs are budgeted on a yearly basis. Costs are
normally presented as an overhaul /non-overhaul year which would be:
$5,542,000 per year with an overhaul, or
$4,675,000 per year without an overhaul.











The purpose of this appendix is to describe the cost
aggregation model that will be used in Appendix E to
estimate total maintenance costs and construct confidence
intervals, for every case where the data conforms to the
requirements established below.
1. Cost Elements
The number of cost elements considered may vary
according to the format of the available data. The primary
elements that will be used are: Regular Overhaul (ROH) or
Selected Restricted Availability (SRA) , Restricted
Availability/ Technical Availability (RA/TA) , Intermediate
Maintenance Activity (IMA), and Commercial Industrial
Service (CIS) . In one case the IMA and CIS cost elements
will be combined and in another a Drydocking SRA (DSRA)
cost element will be required.
2. Data Requirements
The total cost for each cost element over a
specified, but not necessarily equal, number of time
periods is required for each Atlantic Fleet AFS. The






The aggregation model will be ex emp 1 i -F i ed using
a random variable CE representing a generic cost element.
The data for the CE random variable is conveniently
arranged in Table C-1. It is reasonable to assume that the
CE costs for each of the three ships are statistically
independent. In addition, one can assume that the average
CE costs per time period are independent realizations of
the same random variable CE.
TABLE C-1







Cl/Nl C2/N2 . C3/N3
The CE sample mean U and standard deviation S can easily be
calculated using the three average CE cost per time period
values: U = (Cl/Nl + C2/N2 + C3/N3)/3 and
S = ((Cl/Nl - U)**2 + (C2/N2) - U)**2 + (C3/N3 - U)**2)/2.
b. Step Two
One could simply assume a particular sampling
distribution for the random variable CE, but justifying
that assumption would be difficult. Although the underlying
distribution of random variable CE is unknown it is
passible to approximate the distribution of the mean of CE.
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The Central Limit Theorem can be employed to assert that
the random variable CEa, de-fined to be the expected value
(or mean) o-f the random variable CE, is approximately
normally distributed, with mean Ua equal to U, and standard
deviation Sa equal to S divided by the square root o-f
three. That is,
Ua = U and Sa = S / SQR(3).
This assertion would be more tenable if the number o-f ships
in the sample size was large, however, the approximation
should be su-f-ficient for the purposes of this study. The
distribution of the average CE cost for one time period is
now completely specified as N(CEa; Ua, Sa«*2)
.
c. Step Three
The mean and standard deviation of the CEa
random variable is in units of cost per time period, but
the analysis requires the cost per cycle. The unit time
period costs must be aggregated to reflect the entire
cycle. This can be accomplished by defining a new random
variable CEc = CEal + ... + CEap , where p is the number of
time periods the CEa cost will be incurred. Random variable
CEc is the sum of p independently and identically
distributed random variables. Therefore, CEc is a normally
distributed random variable with a mean Uc equal to p times
Ua and standard deviation Sc equal to Sa times the square
root of p. That is,
Uc = p Ua and Sc = Sa SQR(P).
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The distribution of the total cycle cost -For the generic
cost element CE is now specified as N(CEc; Uc, Sc**2)
.
Assume there are k cost elements to be
aggregated. Each of the steps above must be accomplished
for each of those k cost elements. This will result in a






and N(CEck; Uck, Sck**2)
.
e. Step Four
One may now define a random variable to
represent the total cycle cost:
C = CEcl + CEc2 + ... + CEck.
If the normality assumptions of steps one through three are
correct, and if one assumes that the k random variables are
independent, then random variable C will also be normally
distributed. Random variable C will have a mean Ut that is
the sum of the k means, and a standard deviation that is
the square root of the sum of the k squared standard
deviations. That is,
Ut = Ucl + Uc2 + ... + Uck and
St = SQR(Scl**2 + Sc2**2 + + Sck**2)
-
The distribution of the total cycle cost for a single AFS




The final remaining task is to construct the
desired confidence intervals. Based on the normality
assumptions, a 100 times (1-alpha) percent confidence
interval for the total cycle cost C is
Ut +/- Z(l-alpha/2) St,
where Z(l-alpha/2) is the (l-alpha/2) quantile of the
standard normal distribution. A 95 percent CI will be used
in all cases so Z (l-alpha/2) becomes Z(.975) which equals
1.96.
4. Limitations
There are three possible problems with the analysis
above but none should significantly alter the results of
the analysis. The first of these concerns the application
of the Central Limit Theorem in justifying normality, based
a very small sample size. The second possible problem is
the assumption in step four that each of the k cost
elements are independent. The third area of concern is in
the method of adding variances for aggregating the cost
element uncertainties. This has been re-ferred to as the
fallacy of classical statistics with regard to cost
estimating. Indeed, it is not intuitive that the percent





IMA AND CIS MANDAY TO DOLLAR COST CONVERSION MODELS
I. IMA CONVERSION MODEL
A. Objective
The objective o-f this model was to develop a means
for converting Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA)
manday cost data to dollar costs.
B. Methodology
The basic requirement was to determine the
relationship between manday costs and total IMA dollar
costs. The Visibility and Management o-f Operating and
Support Costs - Ships (VAMOSC - Ships) was used as the
source o-f data -for this model. Fiscal year 77—82 IMA cost
data, for the three Atlantic Fleet AFSs, was used to
compute the desired conversion factors. The procedure was
carried out in two steps: (1) The total IMA dollar cost in
FY 84 dollars and the total manhour cost were computed for
the eighteen ship-years of data and (2) The ratio of the
IMA dollar cost to the manhour cost was computed and
converted to units of mandays. This resulted in an index





1. step One—Total Costs
The then year dollar costs were extracted
directly from the Direct Intermediate Maintenance (2.0)
cost element and converted to FY 84 dollars. All of the
costs are summarized in Table D-1. Fiscal year 77-79 manday
TABLE D-1
FY 77-82
IMA Dollar and Manhour Costs for AFS-2, AFS-5, and AFS-6
DOLLAR COST DOLLAR COST
AFS FISCAL YR (THEN YEAR) (FY84 DOLLARS) MANHOUR COST
77 75477.0 131493.0 2945.0
78 121370.0 194503.2 10976.0




80 165086.0 205330.8 12347.0
81 60147.0 68294.5 6835.0
82 61336. 66284. 5825.0
77 137203.0 239029.6 5699.0
78 177062.0 283753.2 12511.0
5 79 126169.0 180757.9 8949.0
80 88189.0 109687.8 3349.0
81 70761.0 80346.3 7457.0
82 58498.0 63217.2 5515.0
77 116512.0 202982.6 2500.0
78 241204.0 386544.9 11147.4
a 79 93086.0 133361.0 5938.0
80 213950.0 266107.0 8013.0
81 51300.0 58249. 4349.0
82 32827.0 35475.2 2989.0
TOTAL 2873649.5 130094.5
costs were calculated by dividing the Reported Maintenace
Labor (2.1), by the Navy Composite Standard Rate (NCSR)
contained in the report description. The VAMOSC - Ships
system used the NCSR to compute the maintenance labor cost
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-from manhour data. The cost element structure was changed
in FY SO so the FY 80-82 manday costs were computed by
summing the Afloat Maintenance Manhours (2.1.1) and Ashore
Maintenance Manhours (2.2.1). The total IMA costs -For
AFS-2, AFS-5, and AFS-6 , from FY 77 through FY 82, were




The ratio of the total IMA dollar cost in FY 84
dollars to the manhour cost is *22. 1 /manhour . The change
of units from manhours to mandays is based on the
assumption that there are eight manhours per manday. The
revised ratio is therefore ;$ 176. 8/manday ($FY 84 000s).
II. CIS MANDAY TO DOLLAR CONVERSION MODEL
A. Objective
The objective of this model was to develop a means
for converting Commercial Industrial Service (CIS) manday
cost data to dollars.
B. Methodology
The procedure below is based on the assumption of a
variable dollar cost model, that is, the dollar costs are
directly proportional to the manday costs. The procedure
was to use appropriate data from the AFS Phased Maintenance
Program Preliminary Program Evaluation Report CRef. 173 to
find the ratio of dollars to mandays, in constant FY 84
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dollars. Table D-2 summarizes the data used to determine
the conversion factor. The complete set of data is located
in Table B-5.
The total dollar cost, in FY 81 dollars, was then
converted to FY 84 dollars using the FY 81 escalation
factor in Appendix A. This resulted in a total dollar cost
of 339. 3/. 8807 = *385.3 (FY 84 000s). The conversion factor
Mas then calculated to be 385.3*1000/1592 = :f242.0 per
manday.
TABLE D-2












I. FY 75-79 CONVENTIONAL MAINTENANCE COST ESTIMATES
A. Objective
The abjective o-f this section is to estimate the
manday and dollar costs o-f maintaining an AFS under the
conventional maintenance policy for a -five year operating
cycle commencing in FY 75 and ending in FY 79. The analysis
considers only the depot and intermediate level costs. The
results will be used as baseline costs in evaluating the
phased maintenance program. All dollar estimates are in FY
84 dollars to aid in the comparison. Cost escalation was
accomplished using the escalation -factors in Appendix A.
B. Data Source
The estimates in this section are based primarily
on the data contained in Appendix A to the AFS Phased
Maintenance Program Preliminary Program Evaluation Report
dated 30 September 1981 CRe-f. 17 3. The raw data is
contained in Appendix B.
C. Methodology
Two di-fferent approaches were used to accomplish
the objective. The first method involved summing the
recorded cost data to determine the average maintenance
costs for one AFS. The second method used the cost
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aggregation model that was outlined in Appendix C,
resulting in point estimates and con-fidence intervals.
1. Method One
a. Description
The basic approach was to use available
data to compute the average manday and dollar costs for
each o-f the four cost elements. The averages were then
summed to obtain the average maintenance cost for an
Atlantic Fleet AFS. The four cost elements considered were
Regular Overhaul (ROH) , Restricted Availability / Technical
Availability (RA/TA) , Intermediate Maintenance (IMA), and
Commercial Industrial Service (CIS)
.
The raw data from Tables B— 1 through B—
4
were placed in a multi -dimension matrix according to the
ship, fiscal year, and cost element. The actual data
portion of Table E-1 is the resulting matrix. Estimates
were made for the cells for which no data was available.
Some additional adjustments to the data were required to
allow dollar costs to be escalated and because not all of
the ships started their five year operating cycle at the
same time. All of the adjustments to the raw data are
documented following Table E— 1.
b. Results
Once the adjustments were completed, the
data for each ship was summed to form cost element
subtotals for each fiscal year. The dollar costs were then

TABLE E-1
Atlantic Fleet AFS Dollar and Manday Costs
Actual and Adjusted FY 75-79 Data
USS Sylvania (AFS-2)
ACTUAL DATA ADJUSTED DATA
FISCAL COST MANDAYS DOLLARS MANDAYS DOLLARS
YEAR ELEMENT (*000s) (*000s)
75 ROH 0.0 0.0 0.0 3892.4
RA/TA N N 1348.0 167.7
IMA N N 883.6 75.9
CIS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
76 ROH 36534.0 5699.0 36534.0 1806.6
RA/TA 1788.0 242. 1 1788.0 242. 1
IMA 1172.0 M 1172.0 109.6
CIS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
77 ROH 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
RA/TA 4614.0 675.5 4614.0 675.5
IMA 1775.0 M 1775.0 180. 1
CIS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
78 ROH 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
RA/TA 4169.0 681.7 4169.0 681.7
IMA 1851.0 M 1851.0 204.2
CIS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
79 ROH 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
RA/TA 9282.0 1697.3 3375.8 610.5
IMA 1886.0 M 1886.0 232.7
CIS 121.0 21.8 121.0 21.8
USS Concord (AFS-5)
ACTUAL DATA ADJUSTED DATA
FISCAL COST MANDAYS DOLLARS MANDAYS DOLLARS
YEAR ELEMENT (*000s) (*000s)
75 ROH 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
RA/TA 151. OP 18. 8P 1725.0 210.6
IMA 982.0 M 982.0 84.4
CIS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
76 ROH 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
RA/TA 1725.0 229.2 1725.0 229.2
IMA 1561.0 M 1561.0 146.0
CIS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
77 ROH 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
RA/TA 3233.0 473.2 3233.0 473.2
IMA 2398.0 M 2398.0 243.4
CIS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
78 ROH 0.0 • 0.0 0.0 4252.6
RA/TA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0





CIS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ROH 56600.0 10006.0 56600.0 5753.4
RA/TA 2973.0 535.9 2973.0 535.9
IMA 1642.0 M 1642.0 202.6
CIS 164.0 28. 6 164.0 28.6
USS San Diego (AFS-6)
ACTUAL DATA ADJUSTED DATA
FISCAL COST MANDAYS DOLLARS MANDAYS DOLLARS
YEAR ELEMENT (*000s) (*000s)
75 ROH 45265.0 4545.0 45265.0 4946.2
RA/TA N N 4062.7 496. 1
IMA 1350.0 11 1350.0 116.0
CIS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
76 ROH 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
RA/TA 4272.0 567.9 4272.0 567.9
IMA 2041.0 M 2041.0 190.9
CIS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
77 ROH 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
RA/TA 5042.0 738.5 5042.0 738.5
IMA 1699.0 M 1699.0 172.4
CIS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
78 ROH 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
RA/TA 4695.0 730.5 4695.0 730.5
IMA 2610.0 M 2610.0 287.9
CIS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
79 ROH 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
RA/TA 2109.0 367.5 1444.7 251.7
IMA 1361.0 M 932.3 115.0
CIS 502.0 87.6 343.9 60.0
N= No data available
P= Partial lack o-f data (missing data for one
or more quarters)
M= Only manday costs available (must be converted
to dollars)
NOTES:
1. The actual data portion of the table reflects the ROH
cost in the fiscal year that the ship came out of overhaul.
The overhauls for AFS-2, AFS-5, and AFS—6 were completed 3
December 1975, 31 January 1979, and 18 October 1974,
respectively. In each case the overhaul was accomplished
during two fiscal years so it is reasonable to expect that
not all of the mandays and dollars were expended during one
fiscal year. The overhaul dollar cost for each of the
bridged years is therefore assumed to be directly
proportional to the fraction of time the ship was in




three percent of AFS-2's overhaul was during FY 75
there-fore one can assume that . 683*5699K = 3892. 4K was
expended in FY 75 and 5699K-3S92. 4K = 1S06.6K in FY 76.
Similar fractions were computed for AFS-5 resulting in an
assumed expenditure of .425*10006K = 4252. 6K in FY 78 and
.575*10006K = 5753. 4K in FY 79. The adjustment for AFS-6
was more complex because some of its overhaul was
accomplished outside of the FY 75-79 time period of
interest here. The easiest way to resolve the problem was
to consider the start date of the overhaul as the start
date of the AFS-6 five year cycle, and end the cycle the
same number of months early. Eighty-six point five percent
of the overhaul was during FY 74 so . 865*4545K = 3931. 4K
was assumed to be expended during FY 74 and 4545K-3931 .4K =
613. 6K in FY 75. The FY 74 dollar cost was then escalated
to FY 75 dollars so it could be included in the cost
estimate. This resulted in an overhaul cost of
613.6K+3931.4K*(.486/.441) = 4946. 2K in FY 75 dollars. The
adjustments that were made to the end of cycle data are
detailed in note 2.
2. Adjustments were necessary for FY 79 costs for AFS-6
because of the inclusion of FY 74 costs in the FY 75 ROH
cost cell. The purpose of the adjustment was to balance out
a five year cycle to avoid double counting. Since AFS—6 was
in overhaul for 31.57. of FY 74, the FY 79 RA/TA, IMA, and
CIS manday and dollar cost cells were reduced by 31. 5X.
3. The FY 75 RA/TA cost for AFS-5 was estimated at 1725
mandays and 210. 6K dollars. The manday estimate is the same
as the figure for FY 76. The dollar estimate is the FY 76
RA/TA cost converted to FY 75 dollars using the OSD
escalation indices. This results in (229. 2K/. 529) . 486 =
210. 6K dollars.
4. The FY 75 RA/TA cost for AFS-2 was estimated as a
percentage of the FY 76 cost using a cost per unit time
approach. AFS-2 was not in overhaul for 62. 2X of FY 75 and
82. 5X of FY 76. The FY 75 manday cost was therefore
estimated to be: 1788* (. 622/. 825) = 1348.0 mandays. The FY
76 RA/TA dollar cost must be converted to FY 75 dollars:
(242. IK/. 529) .486 = 222. 4K. The cost can now can be
computed as before: 222. 4K* ( . 622/. 825) = 167. 7K dollars.
The same method was used to compute an estimate for the FY
75 IMA manday cost for AFS-2: 1 172* (.622/. 825) = 883.6
mandays.
5. The AFS-6 FY 75 RA/TA costs can be estimated using the
same procedure. AFS—6 was out of overhaul for 95. 17. of FY




is there-Fore 4272* (. 951/1 . 0) = 4062.7 mandays. The FY 76
RA/TA dollar cost converted to FY 75 dollars is
(567. 9K/. 529) * .486 = 521. 7K dollars. The RA/TA cost for
FY 75 is there-fore estimated to be: 521 . 7* ( . 951/1 . O) =
496. IK dollars.
6. The IMA dollar costs -for all years were estimated using
manday information. A $176. B/manday (in FY 84 dollars)
conversion -factor was derived in Appendix D. It was
necessary to convert the *176. 8/manday figure to dollars of
the appropriate base year, using the escalation indices in
Appendix A, prior to converting manday costs to dollars.
7. The FY 79 RA/TA costs for AFS-2 were reduced due to the
comments in the data source. The data revealed that 1449. IK
dollars and 7875 mandays were expended in quarter three of
FY 79. The authors indicated that these costs were due to
extensive repairs neccessary for entrance into the phased
maintenance program. The authors also stated that it was
considered an anomaly and therefore was excluded from their
analysis CRef. 17: p. A-IOD. For this analysis, 257. of the
manday and dollar costs, for that quarter, were used in
making the adjustment to the data.
escalated to FY 84 dollars using the escalation factors
listed in Appendix A of this study. The five sets of costs
were then summed over the years to obtain the total manday
and dollar cost, for each cost element. These final numbers
represent the costs, broken down into the four cost
elements, of maintaining the three ships for five years.
The average cost for each of these elements was computed by
dividing the total by three. The total cost of maintaining
one ship for the five year cycle was then estimated by
summing the four cost element averages. These data are




FY 75-79 Conventional Maintenance Cost Estimates
(Average Cost per Ship)
COST DOLLARS





TOTAL 68759 . 3 1 7387 .
6
2. Method Two
The cost aggregation model described in
Appendix C was used to aggregate three cost elements: ROH,
RA/TA, and IMA/CIS. The CIS cost -for each quarter was added
to the IMA cost due to limited CIS cost data.
a. Description
The number of adjustments made to the raw
data are much fewer than in method one because the cost
model does not require holes in the matrix to be filled.
Each adjustment is noted in the applicable paragraph.
The calculation of an average ROH cost was
based on the last three overhauls conducted on the Atlantic
Fleet AFSs. The manday cost was straightforward to compute
but the dollar costs required some adjustments so that the
costs could be put into constant dollars. The adjusted data
is in Table E-1 and note one of that table describes how
the adjustments were made. The FY 84 dollar costs in
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Table E-3 were computed by summing the escalated then year
dollar ROH costs in Table E-1.
TABLE E-3
FY 81-85 Conventional Maintenance ROH Cost Data
(Cost/Cycle)
SHIP ROH START ROH END MANDAYS (FY 84 $000s)
AFS-2 5/15/75 12/03/75 36534.0 11424.2
AF5-5 7/01/78 01/31/79 56600.0 15057.8
AFS-6 6/07/74 10/18/74 45265.0 10177.4
The computation o-f the average RA/TA cost
was based on the unadjusted RA/TA quarterly data in Table
B-2. Forty—eight o-f the forty—nine available ship-quarters
o-f data were utilized. The remaining quarter was excluded
from consideration due to the reason cited in note seven of
Table E-1. The manday and dollar RA/TA costs are shown in
Table E-4.
The computation of the average IMA/CIS cost
was based on the unadjusted IMA data in Table B-3 and CIS
data in Table B-4. The manday costs were converted directly
to FY 84 dollars by multiplying the number of mandays in
the first part of the table by the conversion factor
*176. 8/manday. This factor was derived in Appendix D. The
FY 79 and 80 CIS costs Are also included in Table E-5, on








FY MANDAYS Q MANDAYS Q MANDAYS Q
75 151.0 1
76 1788.0 3 1725.0 4 4272.0 4
77 4614.0 4 3233.0 4 5042.0 4
78 4169.0 4 4695.0 4
79 1407.0 3 2973.0 3 2109.0 4
80 2969.0 4 369.0 2
TOTAL 14947.0 18 8451.0 14 16118.0 16
COST/QTR 830.4 603.6 1007.4
DOLLARS
AFS-2 AFS--5 AFS--6
FY CURRENT FY84 Q CURRENT FY84 G CURRENT FY84 Q
75 18.8 38.7 1
76 242. 1 457.6 3 229.2 433.3 4 567.9 1073.5 4
77 675.5 1176.8 4 473.2 824.4 4 738.5 1286.6 4
78 681.7 1092.5 4 730.5 1170.7 4
79 248.2 355.6 3 535.9 767.8 3 367.5 526.5 4























75 982.0 4 1350.0 4
76 1172.0 3 1561.0 4 2041.0 4
77 1775.0 4 2398.0 4 1699.0 4
78 1851.0 4 2610.0 4
79 1886.0 4 1642.0 3 1361.0 4








TOTAL 9644.0 19 7522.0 17 9563.0 20
COST/QTR 507.6 442.5 478.2
AFS-2 AFS-5 AFS-6
FY FY84 Q FY84 Q FY 84 Q
75 173.6 4 238.7 4
76 207.2 3 276.0 4 360.8 4
77 313.8 4 424.0 4 300.4 4
78 327.2 4 461.4 4
79 333.4 4 290.3 3 240.6 4








TOTAL 1764.9 19 1366.6 17 1727.4 20




(1) Step One. The ROH, RA/TA, and IMA/CIS
manday and dollar cost data is summarized in Tables E-6 and
E-7. The sample means and standard deviations are also
included.
TABLE E-6




TOTAL ROH 36534.0 56600.0 45265.0
NUMBER ROHs ill
AVG ROH/CYCLE 36534.0 56600.0 45265.0
AVERAGE AVG ROH COST / CYCLE = 46133.0 mandays
STANDARD DEVIATION = 10061.1 mandays
TOTAL RA/TA 14947.0 8451.0 16118.0
NUMBER QTRS 18 14 16
AVG RA/TA 830.4 603.6 1007.4
AVERAGE AVG RA/TA COST / QUARTER = 813.8 mandays
STANDARD DEVIATION = 202.4 mandays
TOTAL IMA/CIS 9644.0 7522.0 9563.0
NUMBER QTRS 19 17 20
AVG IMA/CIS 507.6 442.5 478.2
AVERAGE AVG IMA/CIS COST / QUARTER = 476. 1 mandays
STANDARD DEVIATION =32.6 mandays
1. The ROH costs were extracted from Table E-3.
2. The RA/TA costs were extracted from Table E-4.








TOTAL ROH 11424.2 15057.8 10177.4
NUMBER ROMs 1
AVG ROH/CYCLE 11424.2 15057.8 10177.4
AVERAGE AVG ROH COST / CYCLE = * 122 19.
8
STANDARD DEVIATION = *2535.6
TOTAL RA/TA 3795.3 2152.2 4057.3
NUMBER QTRS 18 14 16
AVG RA/TA 210.8 153.7 253.6
AVERAGE AVG RA/TA COST / QUARTER = *206.0
STANDARD DEVIATION = *50.
1
TOTAL IMA/CIS 1764.9 1366.6 1727.4
NUMBER QTRS 19 17 20
AVG IMA/CIS 92.9 80.4 86.4
AVERAGE AVG IMA/CIS COST / QUARTER = *86.6
STANDARD DEVIATION = *6.2
1. All dollars are in thousands o-f FY 84 dollars.
2. The ROH costs were extracted from Table E—3.
3. The RA/TA costs were extracted -from Table E-4.
4. The IMA/CIS costs were extracted -from Table E-5.
(2) Step Two. The Central Limit Theorem
can be used to assert that the distributions o-f random
variables ROHa, RATAa, and IMACISa a.re normally distributed
with the mean and variance parameters indicated in Table
E-8.
(3) Step Three. The ROHa cost already
pertains to a cycle but the other two quarterly elements




FY 75-79 Conventional Maintenance ROH, RA/TA, and IMA/CIS





N(ROHa ; 46133. 0,5808. 8**2) N(ROHa
N(RATAa ; 813.8, 116.8**2) N(RATAa
NdMACISa; 476.1, 18.8**2) NdMACISa
1. RQHa costs are per cycle.
2. RATAa and IMACISa are per quarter.
simply redefined to be ROHc. There are eighteen quarters o-f
RA/TA, IMA, and CIS costs to aggregate to the cycle level.
The eighteen quarters result from the observation that the
three AFS overhauls lasted an average of six months. If one
assumes that no RA/TA, IMA, or CIS costs are incurred
during an overhaul , then eighteen quarters of costs remain
to be aggregated. The sums of normally distributed random
variables are normally distributed random variables.
Therefore, the means and variances of the new random
variables RATAc and IMACISc, representing the cycle costs,
are the old means and variances multiplied by eighteen. The
new distributions are displayed in Table E—9.
TABLE E-9
FY 81-85 Conventional Maintenance ROH, RA/TA, and IMA/CIS
Cycle Cost Distributions
MANDAYS DOLLARS
N(ROHc ; 46133. 0,5808. 8**2) N(ROHa
N (RATAc ; 14648.4, 495.5**2) N (RATAc






(4) Step Four. The total cycle cost can
now be de-Fined to be: C = ROHc + RATAc + IMACISc. It is
normally distributed with a mean and variance equal to the
sum o-f the component means and variances, respectively. The
total cycle cost is, there-fore, N (C; 69351 . 2,5830. 4**2) in
mandays and N <C; 17486. 6; 1469. 0**2) in dollars (FY 84 000s).
(5) Step Five. Ninety—five percent
con-fidence intervals can now be constructed for the total
cycle manday and dollar costs:
69351.2 +/- 5830.4*1.96 or (57923.6,80778.8) mandays and
17486.6 -»-/- 1469.0*1.96 or (14607.4,20365.8) dollars (FY 84
000s)
.
II. FY 81-85 CONVENTIONAL MAINTENANCE COST PROJECTIONS
A. Objective
The objective of this section is to estimate the
manday and dollar costs o-f maintaining an AFS under the
conventional maintenance policy for a five year operating
cycle commencing in FY 81 and ending in FY 85. The analysis
considers only depot and intermediate level maintenance and
is an attempt to estimate the costs of conventional
maintenance as if the phased maintenance program had not
been implemented.
B. Data Source
The source of data for these estimates is Appendix





dated 30 September 1981 CRe-f. 17 3. Some
of this data is enclosed in Appendix B of this study.
C. Methodology
Two basic cost estimates are presented in this
section. The first one is the estimate, in mandays only,
that was contained in the AFS phased maintenance report.
The second method makes use of regression analysis to
estimate ROH cost growth and then uses the cost aggregation
model described in Appendix C.
1. Method One
This cost estimate comes directly from the AFS
Phased Maintenance Program Preliminary Program Evaluation
Report dated September 19B1. The Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations (Logistics) Ships Maintenance and Modernization
Division (OP-43) and NAVSEA atrs primarily interested in
manday costs; therefore, no dollar cost estimates were
included in the report. Table E— 10 summarizes the contents
of Table A— 15 and A— 16 of that report. The cost element
totals in those tables were divided by three to estimate
the cost per ship. The ROH costs in that report were
projected using exponential regression.
2. Method Two
The cost aggregation model outlined in Appendix
C was used to determine this set of point estimates and
confidence intervals. The basic assumption for this method




Phased Maintenance Program Evaluation Report








gets older. The focus will be on ROH costs because graphs
o-f those costs against time show a de-finite increasing
trend. Linear and exponential regression models were
formulated and evaluated.
The RA/TA, IMA, and CIS cost elements are
assumed to be the same as the FY 75—79 conventional policy
estimates because no trends were apparent in the limited
data. These costs were summarized in Tables E—6 and E-7.
a. ROH Cost
Two sets of data were considered for the
regression analysis: the Atlantic Fleet AFSs by themselves,
and all of the AFSs grouped together. The latter
alternative provides more data points for conducting the
regression analysis. The drawback is that there may be
differences between the Atlantic and Pacific fleets that
would confound the results of the regression, especially
for dollar costs. It is well known that dollar costs vary
significantly between public and private shipyards, from
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shipyard to shipyard, and particularly from coast to coast.
For this reason, the entire data set was utilized only in
the manday cost models. The data used in the regression
analysis is presented in Table E-11. It is based on the ROH
data presented in Appendix B to this study. The constant
dollar costs for the three Atlantic Fleet AFS overhauls,
•for Mhich escalation indices were available, were computed
in the previous section and presented in Table E-3. The
calendar dates for each overhaul were converted to the
fiscal year by determining which fiscal year contained the
midpoint of the overhaul.
TABLE E-11
ROH Cost Data
FY FLEET MANDAYS CURRENT *K FY84 *K
72 LANT 32348 2854
74 LANT 45265 4545 10177.4
75 LANT 36534 5699 11424.2
79 LANT 56600 10006 15057.8
75 PAC 28200 4710
75 PAC 30635 5818
77 PAC 57075 10724
79 PAC 50974 12675
80 PAC 52701 18506
One-sided hypothesis tests were conducted
with the probability of a type one error equal to .10. The
hypothesis was Ho: b = O vs. HI: b > O, where b is the
slope in the regression equation. A "significant" in tables
E-12 or E-13 implies that Ho was rejected which means that
the regression equation is significant.
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The results o-f the linear and exponential
regression analysis on the data in Table E-11 are presented
in Tables E-12 and E-13, respectively.
TABLE E-12
ROH Linear Regression Results
Atlantic Fleet Data:
MANDAYS = -199883.4 + 3234.3 * FY
SE = 6041.5 R2 = .788
CV = .142 tb = 2.73 => significant
DOLLARS = -60492.6 + 956.7 FY
SE = 208.9 R2 = .997
CV = .017 tb = 17.14 => significant
(dollars in FY84 000s)
Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Data:
MANDAYS = -206357.0 + 3276.3 * FY
SE = 8053.8 R2 = .576
CV = .186 tb = 3.09 => significant
TABLE E-13
ROH Exponential Regression Results
Atlantic Fleet Data:
In (MANDAYS) = 5.152 + .073 * FY
SE = . 146 R2 = .764
CV = .014 tb = 2.54 => significant
In (DOLLARS) = 3.645 + .076 * FY
SE = .029 R2 = .990
CV = .003 tb = 9.86 => significant
(dollars in FY 84 000s)
Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Data:
In (MANDAYS) = 4.762 + .077 FY
SE = .200 R2 = .550
CV = .019 tb = 2.92 => significant
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The linear models, for Atlantic Fleet data
only, resulted in larger R-squared values than any of the
exponential models, or linear models based on all o-f the
data. In addition, there was no a—priori reason to believe
that the data should be exponential. For these reasons, the
linear models based only on the Atlantic Fleet data were
used to project the ROH manday and dollar costs. This is in
contrast to the exponential regression used by American
Management Systems, Inc. in the method one cost projection.
If the AFSs had not entered the phased maintenance program
it was expected that they would undergo regular overhauls
during the fiscal years indicated in Table E-14 CRef. 17:
pp. A-2, A-31 H. The projected manday and dollar costs are
presented in Table E-14.
TABLE E-14
Projected FY 81-85 Conventional Maintenance Policy
Average RQH Manday and Dollar Costs
AFS-2 AFS-5 AFS-6
FISCAL YR FY 81 84 85
MANDAYS 62094.9 71797.8 75032.1
FY 84 ($000s) 17000.1 19870.2 20826.9
b. Aggregation
(1) Step One. A summary of the ROH manday
and dollar cost data along with the sample means and
standard deviations is presented in Table E— 15. The same
information for the RA/TA, IMA, and CIS costs was




FY 81-85 Projected Conventional Maintenance





AVERAGE AVG ROH COST/CYCLE = 69641.6





TOTAL ROH DOLLARS 17000.
1
19870.2 20826.9
NUMBER ROHs 1 1 1
AVG ROH/CYCLE 17000. 19870.2 20826.9
AVERAGE AVG ROH COST/CYCLE = * 19232. 4 (FY 84 000s)
STANDARD DEVIATION = * 199 1.5 (FY 84 000s)
(2) Steps Two and Three. The second and
third steps in aggregating the RA/TA, IMA, and CIS costs
were completed in the previous section of this appendix.
The results are displayed in Table E-9. Using the in-for
—
(nation in Table E-15, the revised ROHc random variable is:
N(ROHc; 69641.6, 3887.1**2) in mandays and N(ROHc; 19232.4,
1149.8**2) in dollars.
(3) Step Four. The total cycle cost can
now be de-Fined to be C = ROHc + RATAc + IMACISc. It is
normally distributed with a mean and variance equal to the
sum o-f the means and a sum of the variances, respectively.
The total cycle cost C is, therefore, N(C;92859.8,





(4) Step Five. Ninety—five percent
confidence intervals can now be constructed for the total
cycle manday and dollar costs:
92859.8 +/- 3919.4*1.96 or (85177.8,100541.8) mandays and
24499.2 +/- 1156.4*1.96 or (22232.6,26765.7) dollars (FY 84
000s)
.
III. FY 81-85 PHASED MAINTENANCE COST PROJECTIONS
A. Objective
The objective of this section is to estimate the
manday and dollar costs of maintaining an AFS under the
phased maintenance policy for a five year operating cycle
commencing in FY 81 and ending in FY 85. The analysis
considers only the depot and intermediate level
maintenance.
B. Data Source
The sources of data for these estimates are the
second and third formal AFS Phased Maintenance Program
(AFSPMP) evaluation reports CRef. 16 and 18] which were
produced by the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA 911) in
conjunction with American Management Systems, Inc. The
reports are dated March 1983 and August 1983, respectively.





Two methods were used to estimate the desired
costs. The first one is a simple aggregation of the costs
listed in the two AFSPMP evaluation reports and results in
point estimates only. The second method makes use of the
cost aggregation model described in Appendix C to determine
point estimates and confidence intervals for the dollar and
manday costs.
1. Method One
The depot and intermediate level manday and
dollar cost data are summarized in Table E-16. The depot
level manday and dollar cost data were extracted from Table
B-6. The intermediate level manday data was extracted from
TABLE E-16
AFS Phased Maintenance Program Evaluation Reports
FY 81-85 AFSPMP Maintenance Policy Projected Depot


































1. All dollars in thousands.
2. The IMA and CIS dollar costs were computed
using the mandays in Table B—7 and the
conversion factors in Appendix D.
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Table B-7. The intermediate level dollar costs had to be
estimated -from the manday costs in Table B-7 using the
conversion -factors derived in Appendix D. The IMA manday to
dollar conversion -Factor is *176.S (*FY B4) per manday and
the CIS manday to dollar conversion -Factor is *242.0 (*FY
84) per manday.
A point estimate o-F the total FY Sl-85 AFSPMP
depot and intermediate level maintenance costs for the
average AFS is then calculated to be 82379.0 mandays and
*29644.3 (000s). These averages were determined by
computing the total manday and dollar costs -For the three
ships and dividing by three. The total dollar cost is not
given in terms o-F a base year because the depot level costs
in the program evaluation report were the sum o-F various
then year dollars.
2. Method Two
The cost aggregation model in Appendix C was
used to determine point estimates and con-Fidence intervals
for the dollar and manday costs.
a. Step One
The SRA, RA/TA, IMA, and CIS manday and
dollar cost data is contained in Tables E— 17 and E— IS.
These data were extracted -From Tables B—6 and B—7. The




FY 81-85 AFSPMP SRA, RA/TA, IMA, and CIS Manday Cost Data
AFS-2 AFS-5 AFS-6
MANDAYS MANDAYS MANDAYS
TOTAL SRA 31786.0 30298.0 29319.0
NUMBER SRAs 2 2 2
AVG SRA/CYCLE 15893.0 15149.0 14659.5
AVERAGE AVG SRA COST / CYCLE = 15233.8 mandays
STANDARD DEVIATION = 621.1 mandays
TOTAL RA/TA 2272.0 3648.0 3795.0
NUMBER QTRS 7 8 10
AVG RA/TA 324.6 456.0 379.5
AVERAGE AVG RA/TA COST / QUARTER = 386.7 mandays
STANDARD DEVIATION = 66.0 mandays
TOTAL IMA 748.0 1186.0 1557.0
NUMBER QTRS 3 4 6
AVG IMA 249.3 296.5 259.5
AVERAGE AVG IMA COST / QUARTER = 268.4 mandays
STANDARD DEVIATION = 24.8 mandays
TOTAL CIS 820.0 438.0 866.0
NUMBER QTRS 3 4 6
AVG CIS 273.3 109.5 144.3
AVERAGE AVG CIS COST / QUARTER = 175.7 mandays


















AVERAGE AVG RA/TA COST / QUARTER = *92.7
STANDARD DEVIATION = ^13.8
AVERAGE AVG IMA COST / QUARTER = *47.5












AVERAGE AVG SRA COST / CYCLE =





TOTAL IMA 132.2 209.7 275.3
NUMBER QTRS 3 4 6
AVG IMA 44. 1 52.4 45.9
TOTAL CIS 198.4 106.0 209.6
NUMBER QTRS 3 4 6
AVG CIS 66. 1 26.5 34.9
AVERAGE AVG CIS COST / QUARTER = $42.5
STANDARD DEVIATION = $20.9
1. All dollars in thousands.
2. The IMA and CIS costs were computed using the





The Central Limit Theorem can be used to
assert that the distributions o-f random variables SRAa,
RATAa, IMAa, and CISa are normally distributed as indicated
in Table E-19. In addition, there is a Drydocking SRA
(DSRA) once each cycle that is estimated to be 1.36 times
as long as a normal SRA CRe-f. 16: p. 1 11-8 3.
TABLE E-19















1. SRAa costs are per SRA.
2. RA/TA, IMA, and CIS costs are per quarter.
The DSRAa random variable is a simple linear transformation
of the SRAa random variable. This implies that DSRAa is
normally distributed with a mean that is 1.36 times the
mean of SRAa and a variance that is 1.36 squared times the
variance of SRAa: N (DSRAa; 20718.0,487.7**2) for the manday
case and N (DSRAa; 8177.4,147.2**2) for the dollar case,
c. Step Three
The five cost elements must now be
aggregated into five sets of cycle costs. The only cost
variable that does not require change is DSRAa. Since it is
already in units of cost per cycle it will simply be
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rede-fined to be DSRAc. There are, however, three other SRAs
and twenty quarters of RA/TA, IMA, and CIS costs that must
be aggregated to the cycle level. The sums o-f normally
distributed random variables aire normally distributed
random variables. There-fore, the means and variances o-f the
new random variables SRAc , RATAc, IMAc, and CISc,
representing the cycle costs, are the old means and
variances multiplied by the number of time periods in a
cycle—three for SRA and twenty for RA/TA, IMA, and CIS.
The new distributions are displayed in Table E-20.
TABLE E-20




















The total cycle cost can now be defined to
be: C = SRAc + DSRAc + RATAc + IMAc + CISc. It is normally
distributed with a mean equal to the sum of the means, and
a variance equal to the sum of the variances. The total
cycle cost is, therefore, N (C; 83035.4,840. 4**2) in mandays




Ninety-five percent can-fidence intervals
can now be constructed -for the total cycle manday and
dollar costs:
83035.4 +/- 840.4*1.96 or (81388.2,84682.6) mandays and
29869.8 +/- 247.2*1.96 or (29385.3,30354.3) dollars. The
dollars are in thousands but no base year is given due to
the -fact that then year dollars were added together in the
original data.
IV. FY 81-85 MILITARY SEAL IFT COMMAND COST ESTIMATE
A. Objective
The objective o-f this section is to estimate the
depot and intermediate level maintenance manday and dollar
costs -for an AFS under the Military Seal if t Command
maintenance policy for a five year operating cycle
commencing in FY 81 and ending in FY 85- This is an attempt
to determine how much it would cost MSC to maintain an AFS,
if one was transferred to it. The dollar estimates were
converted to FY 84 dollars using the escalation factor in
Appendix A to aid in comparing different maintenance
policies. None of the one—time conversion costs (from Navy
to civil service manning) were considered. In addition, no





The estimate in this section is based primarily on
the in-formation contained in a letter from the Military
Sealift Command (MSC) to Information Spectrum, Inc. This
letter was the basis for the MSC maintenance cost
calculations in Final Report, Civilian Manning of AE, AFS,
and AD Type Support Ships CRef. 19 D, which was published 5
April 1983. The letter was incorporated as Appendix J to
that study and is reproduced in Appendix B to this study.
The Military Sealift Command stated, "A high confidence
level is placed upon the data if the assumed conditions
were, in fact, the actual conditions existing on board the
ships." CRef. 19: p. J-23 Their primary assumption was
that the material condition of the ship would be good to
excellent. The reported average maintenance and repair cost
data is reproduced in Table E-21. The overhaul and
mid—period repair averages are biennial costs and the
remaining four are annual costs.
TABLE E-21
MSC Estimated Average Maintenance and Repair Costs




ALTERAT I ONS 830 .
EXTRAORDINARY REPAIRS 678.0
ACCIDENT/DAMAGE 35.0
Telephone conversation with Mr. Richard Osseck of




The cost element structure was not conducive to
estimating intermediate level costs but the MSC equivalent
of intermediate maintenance is probably included in the
cost elements above. The first four cost elements in Table
E-21 were aggregated to form estimates of the scheduled and
unscheduled depot level maintenance costs. These costs were
then summed to estimate the total cycle maintenance cost.
The last two average costs were not included because it was
not clear what those costs represent.
The overhaul, mid-period repair, and alteration
cost elements were considered to be scheduled depot level
work. These elements represent an annual cost of 1950.0/2 +
1200/2 + 830.0 = *2405.0 (FY 82 000s) or 2405. O/. 92535 =
$2599.0 (FY 84 OOOs) . The unscheduled depot level annual
cost was $1940.0 (FY 82 OOOs) or 1940. O/. 92535 = $2096.5
(FY 84 OOOs). The estimated cycle costs for these elements
are five times as large: $12995.0 and $10482.5 (FY 84
OOOs). The total annual cost of depot level maintenance is
2599.0 + 2096.5 = $4695.5 (FY 84 OOOs). The depot level
cost for a five year operating cycle can then be calculated
to be $23477.5 (FY 84 OOOs) by summing the two cycle costs
or multiplying the total annual cost by five.
The data was too limited to construct a standard
confidence interval because MSC did not include an estimate
of the variance. A confidence interval can be generated if
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one assumes a distribution and variance -for the annual
cost. It was assumed that the annual cost is a normally
distributed random variable (Csl) with mean Ua = *4695.5.
The variance was estimated by assuming that the maximum and
minimum possible Ca values were within +/- P*100 percent of
Ua. The standard deviation was then estimated to be
(2*P*Ua/6) . The distribution o-f the annual cost was then
specified to be N(Ca; 4695. 5, <2*P*Ua/6) **2) . The cycle cost
was assumed to be a normally distributed random variable
because it is the sum o-f -five independent normally
distributed random variables. The cycle mean and variance
are -five times the annual mean and variance resulting in a
cycle cost with distribution N (Cc;23477. 5, 5* ( (2*P*Ua/6)
**2) ) . Con-fidence intervals were then established using
Step 5 o-f Appendix C. Table E-22 presents the lower and
upper 95 percent con-fidence limits for several assumed
values of P. For example, if one assumes
TABLE E-22
95 Percent Confidence Intervals for MSC Cycle Cost
P PERCENT CYCLE S.D. LOWER UPPER
.05 +/- 5-/. 175.0 23134.5 23S20.5
. 10 +/- 107. 350.0 22791.5 24143.5
.20 +/- 207. 700.0 22105.6 24849.4
.30 +/- 307. 1049.9 21419.6 25535.4
.40 +/- 407. 1399.9 20733.6 26221.4
.50 +/- 50% 1749.9 20047.7 26907.3
1. The standard deviation and the lower and upper
bounds Are in units of FY S4 *000s.
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that the annual cost is no less than 50 percent of :$:4695.5
and no more than 50 percent higher than *4695.5 then the 95
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